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This chapter surveys the theoretical literature on statistical discrimination and affirmative action. This
literature suggests different explanations for the existence and persistence of group inequality. This
survey highlights such differences and describes in these contexts the effects of color-sighted and color-blind
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iii1 Introduction
Statistical discrimination generally refers to the phenomenon of a decision-maker using
observable characteristics of individuals as a proxy for unobservable, but outcome-relevant
characteristics. The decision-makers can be employers, college admission ocers, health
care providers, law enforcement ocers, etc., depending on the specic situation. The
observable characteristics are easily recognizable physical traits which are used in society
to broadly categorize demographic groups by race, ethnicity, or gender. But, sometimes
the group characteristics can also be endogenously chosen, such as club membership or
language.
In contrast to taste-based theories of discrimination (see Becker 1957), statistical dis-
crimination theories derive group inequality without assuming racial or gender animus, or
preference bias, against members of a targeted group. In statistical discrimination models,
the decision makers are standard utility or prot maximizers; and in most, though not all,
models, they are also imperfectly informed about some relevant characteristics of the indi-
viduals, such as their productivity, qualications, propensity to engage in criminal activity,
etc., which rationally motivates the use of group statistics as proxies of these unobserved
characteristics. While all models of statistical discrimination share these features, there
exist important dierences, which suggest dierent explanations for group inequality. This
survey is structured to present these explanations and highlight these dierences.1
The two seminal articles in this literature { Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) { which are
often cited together, proposed in fact two dierent sources of group inequality. In Phelps
(1972), and the literature that originated from it, the source of inequality is some unex-
plained exogenous dierence between groups of workers, coupled with employers' imperfect
information about workers' productivity. In the classic textbook example, if employers be-
lieve (correctly) that workers belonging to a minority group perform, on average, worse
than dominant group workers, then the employers' rational response is to treat dierently
workers from dierent groups that are otherwise identical. In another example which is
sometimes mentioned in labor economic textbooks, employers believe from past experience
that young female workers have less labor market attachment than men, perhaps because
of a higher propensity to engage in child-rearing. Therefore, they will be reluctant to invest
in specic human capital formation of women, even if women are equally qualied as men.
The employers' inability to observe individual's true labor market attachment forces them
to rely on the group average. This makes it harder for women to achieve a higher labor
1For earlier surveys of the related literature with a stronger emphasis on empirical research, see Cain
(1986) and Altonji and Blank (1999).
1market status. We survey this strand of the literature in Section 2.
In the literature that originated from Arrow (1973), average group dierences in the
aggregate are endogenously derived in equilibrium, without assuming any ex ante exoge-
nous dierences between groups. Even in this strand of literature decision makers hold
asymmetric beliefs about some relevant characteristic of members from dierent groups,
but the asymmetry of beliefs is derived in equilibrium. This is why these beliefs are some-
times referred to as \self-fullling stereotypes". The typical approach in this literature is
to design a base model with only one group that is capable of displaying multiple equilib-
ria. When membership to \ex-ante" identical groups is added to the setup, between-group
inequality can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome when the discriminated group fails
to coordinate on the same equilibrium played by the dominant group. While there are
always symmetric, \color-blind" equilibria in which groups behave identically, groups do
not interact in these models. This feature, together with equilibrium multiplicity, makes
coordination failure possible for one group. We describe these models in Section 3.
But coordination failure is not the only source of inequality in models with self-fullling
stereotypes. A recent strand of literature, which we describe in Section 4, emphasizes
inter-group interactions in models with complementarities (for example in production tech-
nology). Asymmetric equilibria are possible where ex ante identical groups specialize in
tasks that have dierent marginal productivity. These equilibria may exist even when there
is a unique symmetric equilibrium. Because of the complementarities, in this class of mod-
els there are conicting interests among groups regarding issues such as armative action.
Section 4 will also present a model where group inequality emerges as a result of job search
frictions instead of informational frictions, and a model where group identities, as well as
skill investment decisions, are endogenously chosen.
Most of these models, with some exceptions, are not designed to explain which group
ends up being discriminated. Groups are ex-ante identical, therefore the focus of these
theories lies more in trying to explain the persistence of inequality, rather than its origins,
which are implicitly assumed to be based on historical factors. These considerations are
more appropriately studied by dynamic models. We survey the small dynamic statistical
discrimination literature in Section 5.
In the following Section 6 we will look at dierent policy implications from these models,
in particular using the models with self-fullling stereotypes. Outcome-based policies, such
as armative action quotas, or the application of disparate impact tests, seem particularly
suited to eliminate inequality based on self-fullling stereotypes. If the imposition of the
quota can eliminate the asymmetric discriminatory equilibria and lead dierent groups
2to coordinate on a symmetric outcome, then the temporary armative action policy might
eliminate inequality. Typically, however, the literature nds that outcomes where inequality
persists will remain possible, despite the fulllment of the policy requirements. While
policies may be designed so that only symmetric outcomes remain after their applications,
such policies are typically dependent on special modeling assumptions. We also review
in this section some interesting theoretical analysis that compares the \color-sighted" and
\color-blind" armative action policies in college admissions.
Finally, Section 7 presents some considerations regarding the eciency properties of
discriminatory outcomes in statistical discrimination models, and Section 8 concludes.
The concept of statistical discrimination has been applied mostly to labor market ex-
amples where employers discriminate against one group of workers. This is why this survey
presents mostly labor market related examples, but the reader is advised to consider that
the same concepts and theories are applicable to other markets and socio-economic situ-
ations. We have chosen for convenience to always use racial discrimination of W(hites)
against B(lacks) as the running example because this has been the choice in most of the lit-
erature. This choice of notation should not be interpreted as implying that other examples
are less relevant, or that racial inequality is the most relevant application of all the theories
this survey will describe.
2 The use of group averages as a proxy for relevant
variables: the exogenous dierences literature
In this section we describe a simple model where group identity serves as a proxy for
unobserved variables that are relevant to economic outcomes. We begin with describing
a version of the seminal model of statistical discrimination by Phelps (1972). This model
generates inequality from dierent sources, depending on the details of how the labor market
is modeled, and on the nature of the groups' intrinsic dierences.
2.1 A basic model of signal extraction
Consider the example of an employer that does not observe with certainty the skill level
of her prospective employees, but observes group identity j = fB;Wg. Workers' skill q is
assumed to be equal to the value of their marginal product when employed, and is drawn
from a Normal skill distribution N(j;2
j). Employers observe group identity and a noisy
signal of productivity,  = q + "; where " is a zero-mean error that is normally distributed
according to N(0;2
"j).
3In a competitive labor market where all employers share the same type of information,
workers are paid the expected productivity conditional on the value of the signal. Each
employer infers the expected value of q from  using the available information, including
group identity. The skill and the signal are jointly normally distributed, and the conditional
distribution of q given  is normal with mean equal to a weighted average of the signal and














Intuitively, if the signal is very noisy (that is, if the variance of " is very high), the
expected conditional value of workers' productivity is close to the population average re-
gardless of the signal's value. At the other extreme, if the signal is very precise ("j is close
to zero), then the signal provides a precise estimate of the worker's ability.
Phelps (1973) suggested two cases that generate inequality, which is implicitly dened
as an outcome where two individuals with the same signal, but from dierent groups, are
treated dierently.
Case 1. In the rst case, assume that groups' signals are equally informative, but one
group has lower average human capital investment, that is, "B = "W = "; and B =
W = ; but B < W: In this case, B workers receive lower wages than W workers with
the same signal, because employers rationally attribute them lower expected productivity,
after observing they belong to a group with lower productivity.
Case 2. In the second case, the unconditional distributions of skills are the same
between the two groups (B = W = ; but B = W = ); but the signals employers
receive are dierently informative, e.g. "B > "W:2 From this assumption, it follows that B
workers with high signals receive lower wages than same-signal workers from the W group,
and the opposite happens to workers with low signals.
While this basic model is capable of explaining dierential treatment for same-signal
workers from dierent groups, on average workers of the two groups receive the same average
wage, unless average productivity is assumed to be exogenously dierent as in Case 1, which
is not an interesting case from a theoretical perspective.
Note also that in this model all workers are paid their expected productivity conditional
on available information. Thus, dierential treatment of same-signal workers from dierent
groups does not represent \economic discrimination," which is said to occur if two workers
2This assumption can be rationalized assuming some communication of language barriers between em-
ployers and minorities, see, e.g., Lang (1996).
4with identical (expected) productivity are paid dierently.3; 4
2.2 Generating average group wage dierentials
In this section we present various extensions of Phelps' model that generate dierent
group outcomes. All of these extensions are based on Phelps' \Case 2 " assumption of
dierent signal informativeness across groups.
2.2.1 Employers' risk aversion
Aigner and Cain (1977) proposed to incorporate employers' risk aversion into the stan-
dard Phelps' setup. Assuming, for example, that employers' preferences are given by
U(q) = a + bexp( cq);
then employers' expected utility from hiring a worker with signal  is given by

















which is increasing in "j: This implies that wages are decreasing in "j; therefore the
group with the higher noise (e.g., B workers if "B > "W) receives, on average, a lower
wage. Employers are compensated for the risk factor incorporated in each B worker's higher
uncertainty about productivity, measured by the term cV ar(qj)=2.
2.2.2 Human capital investment
Lundberg and Startz (1983) adopted a dierent approach, which was later exploited by
the literature we will review in sections 3 and 4. They assumed that worker's productivity
q is partly determined by a costly human capital investment choice the worker undertakes
before entering the labor market. Specically, they parameterize q = a + bX; where X is
human capital investment, b is a parameter common to all workers, and a is drawn from
a Normal distribution with mean  and variance 2; common to groups B and W: The
3See Stiglitz (1973) and Cain (1986) for early distinctions between statistical and economic discrimination.
4In Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked (2000) discussed in Section 4.2, dierential treatment of workers with
dierent races features economic discrimination.
5investment cost is a convex function C(X) = cX2=2: After the human capital investment
decision is made, the labor market works as in case 2 of Phelps' model, that is, groups are
assumed to dier in the informativeness of the signal of productivity. Specically, workers
from group j with productivity q receive a signal  = q + "j where as before "j is drawn
from a Normal density N(0;2
"j):






























that is, members of the group with the higher signal noise invest less than members from
the group with the lower signal noise.5 Assuming for example that 2
"B > 2
"W; then in the
labor market outcome workers from group B receive lower wages, on average, than workers
from group W despite sharing the same distribution of ex ante human capital endowment
a. This outcome clearly relies on the existence of some form of heterogeneity across groups,
namely, the signal informativeness.
2.2.3 Tournaments
Cornell and Welch (1996) embedded Phelps' \Case 2" assumption in a tournament mo-
del. Their observation was that if one group has a more informative signal, then this group's
variance of the expected productivity is higher. For example, using Phelps' simple parame-
terization, workers with signal greater than the average have higher expected productivity if
the signal is more precise, whereas the opposite is true for workers with a signal lower than
their expected productivity. If labor demand is limited compared to supply (e.g. the pool
of candidates for a job is larger than the number of positions available), then jobs will go to
the candidates with higher signals. Even if groups receive the same signals on average, the
probability that the best signals belong to candidates from the dominant group is higher,
which generates group inequality.
5A version of this model can be written with heterogeneous investment costs. Moro and Norman (2003b)
use this parameterization to generate log-normally distributed wages in equilibrium which are suitable for
empirical investigation.
6This intuition carries to more general parameterization. Cornell and Welch (1996) model
informativeness by assuming that many signals of productivity are available, all drawn from
the same distribution, and assume that members of the dominant group can send employers
a larger number of signals than members of the discriminated group. They prove that for
any underlying signal distribution, the variance of the expected productivity is higher for
the dominant group. As the number of candidates relative to the number of spots increase,
the probability that all positions are lled by members of the dominant group approaches
one.
3 Discriminatory outcomes as a result of coordination
failure
In the models reviewed in Section 2, race, gender, or any group aliation, is used in
the determination of wages by rms in the competitive market because the distribution
of signals about workers' productivity exogenously depends on the group identities. In
this section we review the literature that derives group dierences endogenously even when
groups share identical fundamentals. Outcomes with inequality can be thought of as the
result of a self-fullling prophecy, and can be interpreted as group-wide coordination into
dierent equilibria of a base model in which group identity is ignored.
3.1 Origin of equilibrium models of statistical discrimination
Arrow's (1973) paper laid out the ingredients for a theory of discriminatory outcomes
based on \self-fullling prophecies" with endogenous skill acquisition. First, the employers
should be able to costlessly observe a worker's race. Second, the employers must incur some
cost before they can determine the employee's true productivity (otherwise, there is no need
for the use of surrogate information such as race or gender). Third, the employers must
have some preconception of the distribution of productivity within each of the two groups
of workers.
Arrow proposed the following model. Suppose that each rm has two kinds of jobs,
skilled and unskilled, and the rms have a production function f (Ls;Lu) where Ls is skilled
labor and Lu is the unskilled labor. Denote with f1 and f2 the rst derivatives of f with
respect to the rst and second arguments, respectively. All workers are qualied to perform
the unskilled job, but only skilled workers can perform the skilled job.
Skills are acquired through investment. Workers have skill investment cost c; which
is distributed in the population according to the cumulative distribution function G()
7which does not depend on group identity. Suppose that a proportion W of whites and a
proportion of B of blacks are skilled, which will be determined in equilibrium. In order
to endogenize the skill investment decisions, Arrow proposed the following model of wage
dierences on the skilled and unskilled jobs. Suppose that workers are assigned either to the
skilled job or to the unskilled job. If a worker is assigned to the unskilled job, she receives a
wage wu = f2 (Ls;Lu); independent of the race group of the worker. If a worker is assigned
to the skilled job, then Arrow assumes that the worker will receive a wage contract that
pays a group j 2 fB;Wg worker wage wj > 0 if that worker is tested to be skilled and
0 otherwise. Finally the rm must pay a cost r to nd out whether or not the worker is
skilled. Arrow claims that competition among rms will result in a zero prot condition,
therefore,
r = W [f1 (Ls;Lu)   wW];












Note that if for some reason B < W; then wB < wW:Thus, blacks will be paid a lower
wage in the skilled job if they are believed to be qualied with a lower probability. As a
result, Arrow (1973) shifted the explanation of discriminatory behavior from preferences to
beliefs.
Arrow then provided an explanation for why W and B might dier in equilibrium
even though there are no intrinsic dierences between groups in the distribution of skill
investment cost G(). Workers invest in skills if the gains of doing so outweigh the costs.
Arrow takes the gains to be wj   wu for group j workers.6 Given the distribution of skill
investment cost G(); the proportion of skilled workers is G(wj   wu); namely the fraction
of workers whose skill investment cost c is lower than the wage gain from skill investment
wj   wu. Equilibrium requires that
j = G(wj (W;B)   wu); for j 2 fB;Wg: (3)
In a symmetric equilibrium, W = B; and in an asymmetric equilibrium, B 6= W: Arrow
then notes that the system (3) can have symmetric as well as asymmetric equilibria. The
6Note that this is not entirely consistent with the labor market equilibrium conditions. Because wu > 0,
and any unqualied worker who is hired on the skilled job will eventually get a wage 0; no unqualied worker
should agree to be hired on the skilled job in the rst place.
8intuition for the asymmetric equilibria is simple: if very few workers invest in a particular
group, the rms will rationally perceive this group as unsuitable for the skilled task and
equilibrium wages for this group in the skilled job will be low, which will in turn give little
incentive for the workers from this group to invest. That is, self-fullling prophecies can
lead to multiple equilibria. If groups coordinate on dierent equilibria, then discrimination
arises with one group acquiring less human capital and receiving lower wages than the other
group.7
3.2 Coate and Loury (1993a)
Coate and Loury (1993a) presented an equilibrium model of statistical discrimination
where two ex ante groups may end up in dierent, Pareto ranked, equilibria. Coate and
Loury's model formalizes many of ideas that were originally presented loosely in Arrow
(1973), but it assumes that wages are set exogenously from the model.8 The key elements
of Coate and Loury's model is that a worker's costly skill investment may not be perfectly
observed by rms. Thus rms may rely on the race of the worker as a useful source of
information regarding the worker's skill. This introduces the possibility of self-fullling
equilibria. If the rms believe that workers from a certain racial group are less likely to be
skilled, and thus impose a higher threshold in assigning these workers to higher paying jobs,
it will indeed be self-fullling to lower these workers' investment incentives, which in turn
rationalizes the rms' initial pessimistic belief. Analogously, more optimistic belief about
a group can be sustained as equilibrium. This is the source of multiple equilibria in Coate
and Loury model. Discriminatory outcomes arise if two groups of ex ante identical workers
play dierent equilibria.
As in Arrow's model, in this model discrimination is generated by \coordination failure."
It is important to emphasize that in this model there are no inter-group interactions, other
than possibly when armative action policies such as employment quotas are imposed (see
Section 6). In contrast, in the models we discuss in Section 4, inter-group interaction is the
key mechanism for discriminatory outcomes for ex ante identical groups.
7Spence (1974) also suggested an explanation for group inequality based on multiple equilibria in his
classic signaling model.
8This assumption can be relaxed in a model of linear production technology without aecting any of the
main insights. New economic insights emerge if wages are endogenized in a model with nonlinear production
technology. See Moro and Norman(2003, 2004) described in section 4.1.
93.2.1 The Model
Consider an environment with two or more competitive rms, and a continuum of work-
ers with unit mass. The workers belong to one of two identiable groups, B or W, with
 2 (0;1) being the fraction of W in the population.
Firms assign each worker into one of two task that we label as \complex" and \simple".
Coate and Loury assume that wages on the two tasks are exogenous and are as follows: a
worker receives a net wage ! if he is assigned to the complex task, and 0 if he is assigned to
the simple task. The rm's net return from workers, however, depends on the workers' qual-
ications and their assigned task, which are summarized in Table 1. Thus the qualication
is important for the complex task, but not for the simple task.
WorkerTask Complex Simple
Qualied xq > 0 0
Unqualied  xu < 0 0
Table 1: Firms' net return from qualied and unqualied workers in the complex and simple
tasks.
Workers are born to be unqualied, but they can become qualied if they undertake
some costly ex ante skill investment. Suppose that the cost of skill investment, denoted by
c; is heterogenous across workers and is distributed according to cumulative distribution
function (CDF) G(); which is assumed to be continuous and dierentiable. Importantly,
G() is group independent: workers from dierent groups share the same cost distribution.
The most crucial assumption of the model is that workers' skill investment decisions are
unobservable by the rms. Instead, rms observe a noisy signal  2 [0;1] of the worker's
qualication. We assume that the signal  is drawn from the interval [0;1] according to
PDF fq () if the worker is qualied, and according to fu () if he is unqualied. The
corresponding CDF of fq and fu are denoted by Fq and Fu respectively. To capture the
idea that the noisy signal  is informative about the workers' qualication, we assume that
the distributions fq () and fu () satisfy the following monotone likelihood ratio property
(MLRP):
Assumption 1. (MLRP)l()  fq ()=fu () is strictly increasing and continuous in 
for all  2 [0;1]:
It is useful to observe that this assumption is without loss of generality: for any pair of
distributions fq and fu, we can always rank the signals according to the ratio fq ()=fu ()
10and re-label the signals in accordance to their rankings. As we will see below, the MLRP
assumption has two important and related implications. First, it implies that qualied
workers, i.e., workers who have invested in skills, are more likely than unqualied workers
to receive higher signals; second, it also implies that, the posterior probability that a worker
is qualied is increasing in :
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, Nature draws workers' types, namely,
their skill investment cost c from the distribution G(); in Stage 2, workers, after observing
their type c; make the skill investment decisions, which are not perfectly observed by the
rms; instead, the rms observe a common test result  2 [0;1] for each worker drawn
respectively from PDF fq () or fu () depending on the worker's skill investment decision;
nally, in Stage 3, the rms decide how to assign the workers to the complex and simple
tasks.
3.2.2 Firms and workers' best responses
The equilibrium of the model can be solved from the last stage. To this end, consider
rst the task-assignment decision. Suppose that a rm sees a worker with signal  from a
group where a fraction  has invested in skills. The posterior probability that such a worker
is qualied, denoted by p(;); follows from the Bayes' rule:
p(;) =
fq ()
fq () + (1   )fu ()
: (4)
This updating formula, (4), illustrates a crucial insight: in environments with informational
frictions (because workers' skill investment decisions are not perfectly observed by the rms),
rms' assessment about the qualication of a particular worker with test signal  depends
on their prior about the fraction of the group that has invested in skills, i.e., : Hence,
a worker's investment not only increases her own chances of obtaining higher signals and
higher expected wages, but also increases the employers' prior of all workers from the same
group. This informational externality is the key source of the multiplicity of equilibria in
this model.
Now consider the rm's task assignment decision in Stage 3 of a worker with a test
signal  belonging to a group where a fraction  have invested in skills. Using Table 1, the
rm's expected prot from assigning such a worker to the complex task is:
p(;)xq   [1   p(;)]xu; (5)
because with probability p(;) the worker is qualied and will generate xq for the rm, but
with probability 1 p(;) he is unqualied and will lead to a loss of xu if he is mistakenly
11assigned to the complex task. On the other hand, if such a worker is assigned to the simple
task, the rm's prot is 0: Thus, the rm will optimally chooses to assign such a worker to
the complex task in Stage 3 if and only if
p(;)xq   [1   p(;)]xu  0: (6)









Because of the MLRP assumption that fq=fu is monotonically increasing in ; (7) holds if









has a solution in (0;1); then ~ () is the unique solution (where the uniqueness follows
from the MLRP); otherwise, ~ () = 0 if fq (0)=fu (0)  (1   )xu=(xq); and ~ () = 1 if










2 < 0; (9)
where l()  fq ()=fu (). That is, as the prior probability that a worker is qualied gets
higher, the rms will use a lower threshold of the signal in order to assign a worker to the
complex task.
Now we analyze the workers' optimal skill investment decision at Stage 2, given the
rms' sequentially rational behavior in Stage 3 as described above.
Suppose that in Stage 3, the rms choose a task assignment that follows a cuto rule
at ~ . If a worker with cost c decides to invest in skills, he expects to be assigned to the




which is the probability that
a qualied worker will receive a signal above ~  (recall that Fq is the CDF of fq): Thus his






!   c: (10)
If he does not invest in skills, the signal he receives will nonetheless exceed ~ ; and thus be




(recall that Fu is the















Figure 1: Incentives to invest in skills as a function of the cuto ~ 






























! denotes the benet,or incentive, of the worker's skill
investment as a function of the rms' signal threshold ~  in the task assignment decision. A




















< 1: Because l() is assumed to be monotonic, it immediately follows
that I () is a single peaked function. Moreover, I (0) = I (1) = 0: That is, if the rm assigns
all signals (the case ~  = 0); or if the rm assigns no signals (the case ~  = 1) to the complex
task, then workers will have no incentive to invest in skills. Figure 1 depicts one possible
function I () satisfying these properties.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
Given the workers' optimal investment rule in response to the rms' assignment thresh-
old ~  as specied by (12), the fraction of workers who rationally invests in skills given a































;j 2 fB;Wg such that for each j;
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where ~ () and G(I ()) are dened by (8) and (14) respectively. Equivalently, we could
dene the equilibrium of the model as 












From the denition of equilibrium, we see that the only way to rationalize discriminatory
outcome for the blacks and whites is when the above equation has multiple solutions.
Existence of multiple equilibria is not always guaranteed and depends on the shape of
I and G: This possibility can be proven by construction by xing all parameters of fq;
fu; and technology parameters xq; xu; !; and nding an appropriate cost distribution G
such that the system (15-16) has multiple solutions. Note that since G is a CDF, it is an
increasing function of its argument. Therefore, the right-hand side of (16) is a monotone
transformation of (13). This means that function (16) must be initially increasing, at least
in some range of  near 0; and subsequently decreasing, at least in some range of  near 1.
We can nd a multitude of functions G that ensure multiple equilibria. For example,
assume that all workers have a cost of investment zero or positive, so that G(0) = 0: In this
case there is always a trivial equilibrium with  = 0; ~  = 1: To ensure existence of at least
one interior equilibrium pick 0 2 (0;1), and compute 0 by inverting (15). Next, compute
I(0) from (13). If there are a fraction 0 of workers with cost less than or equal to I(0);
then 0 is an equilibrium, and there is an innite number of distributions G that satisfy
this condition. Using the same logic, one can construct G functions that are consistent with
more than one interior equilibria. This is illustrated in Figure 2 which we drew assuming
there exists some ~  at which the curve G(I ()) is higher than the inverse of ~ ():
When groups select dierent solutions to Equation (17), they will display dierent equi-
librium human capital investment, employment, and average wages despite having identical
fundamentals regarding investment cost and information technology. Thus Coate and Loury
demonstrate that statistical discrimination is a logically consistent notion in their model.
Discrimination in this model can be viewed as a coordination failure. Equilibria in this mo-
del are also Pareto-ranked, as it can be shown that both the workers and the rms would
strictly prefer to be in the equilibrium where a higher fraction of workers invest in skills.




















Figure 2: Multiple equilibria in Coate and Loury (1993)
on the good equilibrium. Importantly, there is no conict of interests between whites and
blacks concerning the equilibrium selection: if the blacks were to also coordinate on the bet-
ter equilibrium, the whites would not at all be aected. However, eciency considerations
are somewhat incomplete in this model because wages are set exogenously. We will describe
eciency in equilibrium models of statistical discrimination in more detail in Section 7
4 Discriminatory outcomes due to inter-group interactions
In Coate and Loury (1993a)'s model, discriminatory outcomes arise in a model where
groups could live in separate islands. The privileged group will have no objection whatso-
ever if the disadvantaged group is able to coordinate themselves into the Pareto dominant
equilibrium. In many real-world scenarios, however, we observe conicts of interest be-
tween groups. Models that introduce inter-group interactions in the labor market yield
some important insights regarding the potential sources of discrimination. In this section,
we describe this literature.
4.1 Discrimination as group specialization
154.1.1 A model with production complementarities and competitive wages
Moro and Norman (2004) relaxed the crucial assumptions guaranteeing group sepa-
rability in Coate and Loury's model: the linearity of the production technology and the
exogeneity of wages. They extended Coate and Loury's framework by assuming a more
general technology. In their model output is given by y(C;S); where S is the quantity of
workers employed in the simple task, and C is the quantity of qualied workers assigned to
the complex task; y is strictly quasi-concave, exhibits constant returns to scale and satis-
es Inada conditions so that both factors are essential. We use the notation introduced in
Section 3.2, and write xq(C;S) and xu (C;S) as the marginal products of a qualied worker
in the complex task, and of any worker employed in the simple task, which now depend on
aggregate inputs.
We now characterize the equilibrium in this model. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
the game is a list including the workers' skill investment decision for each cost c, rms
task assignment rules, and wage schedules such that every player optimizes against other
players' strategy proles. It can be shown that the optimal task assignment is a threshold
rule almost everywhere, where only workers above the threshold ~ j; j = B;W, are employed
in the complex task. Recall that group shares are denoted with j;j = B;W. Factor inputs























The thresholds have to be jointly determined for the two groups, because the values of xq
and xu depend on both groups' assignment rules, given both groups' aggregate investment






























; j = B;W (18)
It can be shown that the input factor ratio C=S is monotonically increasing with the fraction
of investors of any group. To see this, note that, if it decreased when j increased, then
the right-hand side of (18) would decrease. But then the only way to satisfy the rst
order condition is to decrease ~ j; because the left-hand side is decreasing in ~ j due to the
16monotone likelihood ratio property assumed for fq and fu: But if both ~ j decrease and j
increase then the factor ratio increases, a contradiction.
To understand how this implication aects group incentives to invest in human capital,










! may increase or
decrease depending only on the value of ~ ; because wages are set exogenously. Moro and
Norman instead derive wages in equilibrium as the outcome of rms competing for workers.
It is possible to show that the solution corresponds to wages equal to the expected marginal
productivity for almost all  2 [0;1], that is
wj() =
(
xu(C;S)  < ~ j
xq(C;S)
jfq()
jfq()+(1 j)fu()   ~ j:
(19)
Figure 3 depicts wj (): Note that the signal value ~ j is the one that equates the marginal
products in the two tasks, because the term multiplied by xq (C;S) is the probability that









Figure 3: Wage as a function of the signal for group j
4.1.2 Cross-group eects
We can now compute incentives to invest and indicate them as a function of the vector








To understand how groups interact, consider the eect on group-B incentives from an
increase in W. As W increases, as noted above, the factor ratio C=S increases. The eect
17on the marginal product is to increase xu and decrease xq. The threshold ~ B increases (at
the margin, it becomes relatively more convenient to use W workers for the complex task
because their likelihood to be qualied increases). This implies that it is more likely for a
B worker to be assigned to the simple task (where wages are independent on the signal).
Fewer B workers are assigned to the complex task and their wage is a atter function of
the signal than before. Taken together, these observations imply that incentives to invest
in human capital decrease when the investment of members of the other group increase.9
This result is crucial because it generates incentives for groups to specialize in employ-
ment in dierent jobs. This creates the possibility for asymmetric equilibria to exist even
when there is a unique symmetric equilibrium (symmetric equilibria where groups invest in
the same proportion are always a possibility).
One asymmetric equilibrium can be constructed by assuming a distribution of investment
cost with G(0) > 0; that is, by assuming that a fraction G(0) of workers always invest.10
Assume 
B = G(0); and that the employers assign all B workers to the simple task. This
is optimal if the marginal product of the group-B worker with signal  = 1 in the complex
task is smaller than her marginal product in the simple task, i.e.,
Bfq (1)
Bfq (1) + (1   B)fu (1)
xq(C;S) < xu(C;S) (20)
This inequality holds when G(0) = B is small enough so that the left hand side is small.
Note that this is true for any value of input factors C and S; which are not aected by the
value of B when this inequality holds, because all B workers are in the simple task. To
complete the characterization one has to nd the equilibrium investment for group W, W:
But once group-B workers' behavior is set, the equilibrium level of 
W is just the solution
of a xed point equation in W; which by continuity always exists. The equilibrium level of

W must be interior because both factors are essential. The essentiality of both tasks imply
that in equilibrium some group-W workers must be employed in the complex task, which
implies that incentives to invest are positive for them, and therefore 
W > 
B = G(0):
While other equilibria with both groups at an interior solution are possible, it is im-
9The eect on incentives of group W of an increase in the same group's investment W is instead
indeterminate, because we also have to take into account the informational externality that acts within
groups. When investment increases in one group, the probability of being qualied of all workers from that
group increases. This has a benecial eect on the slope of the increasing portion of the wage function which
may overcome the negative \price" eect on the marginal products of labor we mentioned when we describe
the cross-group eects.
10With some additional assumption, it is possible to ensure that the model displays a unique symmetric
equilibrium. See Moro and Norman (1996)
18portant that such equilibria cannot be interpreted as group-B's failure to coordinate on a
better outcome. It is not possible for group-B workers to re-coordinate and invest as white
workers do, because when workers of both groups invest in proportion 
W; the optimal
factor ratio changes and marginal products are no longer consistent with equilibrium.
4.1.3 The eect of group size
Constant returns to scale imply that only relative group size matters. In general, an-
alyzing group size eects would mean comparing dierent sets of equilibria. Not only
the analysis becomes more complicated, but as one parameter such as relative group size
changes, some equilibria may disappear and new ones may appear. Therefore, results de-
pend on the details of the equilibrium selection. Intuitively, as the relative size of one
group increases and approaches 1, equilibrium investment for this group will approach the
values corresponding to the symmetric equilibria of the model (which are equivalent to the
equilibrium of a model with only one group). As for the smaller group, depending on the
parameterization either lower or higher investment could be consistent with equilibrium.
Nevertheless, we can rely on the simple corner solution constructed in example at the
end of the previous section to understand the importance of group size. Because both factors
are essential, as discriminated group becomes larger, it becomes more dicult to sustain the
extreme type of task segregation implied by the discriminatory equilibrium constructed in
the previous section. To see this, note that as the discriminated group becomes larger, the
mass of workers employed in the simple task gets larger, and therefore the ratio or marginal
products xu=xq gets smaller; eventually, the inequality (20) cannot be satised and some
group-B workers have to be employed in the complex task. But then the incentives to invest
in human capital for B workers become strictly positive.
Hence, in a sense, sustaining extreme segregation in equilibrium against large groups may
be dicult, rationalizing the existence of institutionalized segregation, such as apartheid
in South Africa, where the larger group was segregated into lower paying tasks before the
collapse of apartheid. It can also be shown that the incentives for the small group workers
to keep the larger group into the segregation-type of equilibrium gets larger the bigger the
large group is. The reason is that the larger the mass of workers employed in the simple
task is, the higher is the marginal product in the complex job. This increases the incentives
to invest for the small group and their benets from investment.
194.2 Discrimination from search frictions
All theories of statistical discrimination we have described so far are based on informa-
tion friction in the labor market: race-dependent hiring policies are followed because race
is used as a proxy for information about the workers' skills. However, all workers are paid
their marginal product and, given skills, color does not play any additional role in explain-
ing racial wage dierences once we control for racial dierences in their skill investment
decisions. That is, there is no \economic discrimination" in the sense of Cain (1986).
Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked (2000) proposed a model of an integrated labor market
and focused on search frictions instead of information friction.11 As in Moro and Norman
(2004), they can derive discriminatory equilibria from a model that displays a unique sym-
metric equilibrium, but the distinguishing feature of search frictions is that discrimination
arises even when employers have perfect information about workers' productivity.
Consider a continuum of rms and workers. All rms are identical, but each worker
belongs to either group B or W. Group identity does not directly aect payos. For
simplicity, suppose that the fraction of group W workers in the population, ; is equal to
1=2:
All workers are born unskilled, and they make skill investment decisions before entering
the labor market. If one acquires skills, he can enter the skilled labor market; otherwise, he
enters the unskilled labor market. The crucial dierence from the models we have seen so
far is that there is no informational friction, that is, workers' skill investment decisions are
observed to the rms. An individual's skill investment cost c  0 is independently drawn
from the distribution G(). Finally, rms and workers die with Poisson rate  and they are
replaced by new rms and workers so that the total populations of both rms and workers
are constant. Time is continuous with interest rate r:
Each rm can hire at most one worker. If a rm employs a skilled worker, regardless
of his color, a ow surplus of x > 0 is generated; the ow surplus from hiring an unskilled
labor is 0:
Search frictions and wage determination. Vacant rms, i.e., rms without an em-
ployee, and unemployed workers match through searches. Searches are assumed to be
costless for both the rms and the workers. Given the assumption that the surplus for a
rm from hiring an unskilled worker is 0; rms will only search for skilled workers. Firms
make a key decision of whether to search both groups, or only one group. Suppose that
11Eeckhout (2006) provides a dierent rationale for inequality arising in a search-matching environment.
See Section (5) for more details.
20a rm searches for workers of both groups, and suppose that the proportion of the skilled
workers in the population is HI and the unemployment rate of skilled workers is I; then
the process describing meetings between unemployed skilled workers and the searching rm
follows a Poisson process with meeting rate FIHI where the parameter F captures the
intensity of rm search. If instead, the rm searches only white workers with intensity F;
then the meeting rate between the rm and the white skilled workers is given by 2FIHI:
Unemployed skilled workers simultaneously search for vacant rms with intensity I and
the meetings generated by workers search follow a Poisson process with rate IF where F
is the vacancy rate of the rms. When an unemployed worker and a vacant rm match, they
bargain over the wage with one of them randomly drawn to propose a take-it-or-leave-it
oer.
Symmetric Steady State Equilibrium. We rst characterize the symmetric steady
state equilibrium in which rms do not pay any attention to the workers' color so we can
treat the workers as a single population. We use subscript I to denote worker related
variables in this section. Let VI denote the value of skills to an individual in equilibrium.
Since an individual will invest in skills only if his skill investment cost c is less than VI; the
fraction of skilled workers in the population will be G(VI): Let HI be the proportion of
skilled workers in the population in the steady state. We must have
HI = G(VI) (21)
in the steady state. The steady state condition for vacancies F is given by
2 (1   F) = FIHI (I + F): (22)
In (22), the left hand side represents the rate of vacancy creation because 1   F is the
fraction of rms which are currently occupied, and at the rate 2 either a worker dies,
creating a vacancy at a previously occupied rm, or an occupied rm dies, and is replaced
by a new vacant rm. The right hand side is the rate of vacancy destruction as a result of
matches being formed due to worker or rm searches. Similarly, the steady state condition
for unemployment rate of the skilled worker I is given by
2 (1   I) = FI (I + F): (23)
Finally, we need to derive VI: Let ! be the expected ow payo of an employed worker
and ZI be the steady-state value of an employed skilled worker. First, familiar results from
dynamic programming give us
(r + 2)ZI = ! + VI;
21where the left hand side (r + 2)ZI can be interpreted as the properly normalized ow
payo of an employed worker, which is exactly equal to the wage ! plus, with probability ;
the worker obtains the expected present value of being returned to the unemployment pool
by surviving a rm death, VI: Similarly, when a skilled worker is unemployed, his value VI
is related to ZI as follows:
[F (F + I) + r + ]VI = F (F + I)ZI:
On the rm side, let  be the expected ow payo to an occupied rm, VF be the steady
state value of a vacant rm, and ZF be the steady state value of a rm who is currently
employing a skilled worker. Since ! + = x; the total ow surplus, we know that the total
surplus when a vacant rm and an unemployed worker match, denoted by S; must satisfy
(r + 2)S = x +  (VI + VF):
Since the rm and the worker divide the surplus from the relationship relative to status
quo, given by S   VF   VI; via Nash bargaining, we have
ZI = VI +
1
2
(S   VF   VI);
ZF = VF +
1
2
(S   VF   VI):
Thus, we can obtain:
VI =
F (F + I)x
(r + )[(F + IHI)(F + I) + 2(r + 2)]
; (24)
VF =
IHI (F + I)x
(r + )[(F + IHI)(F + I) + 2(r + 2)]
(25)
A symmetric steady state is a list (HI;I;F;VI;VF) satisfying the steady state conditions
(21)-(25). A symmetric steady state is a symmetric equilibrium if the postulated search
behavior of the rms, i.e., each rm searches both colors of workers, is optimal. Obviously,
since the two groups of workers are behaving identically, any symmetric steady state will
indeed be a symmetric equilibrium. With some algebra, Mailath, Shaked and Samuelson
showed that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique.
Asymmetric Equilibrium. Now consider the asymmetric equilibrium in which rms
search only white workers. Under the postulated search behavior of the rms, skilled black
workers can be matched to rms only through the worker searches, but the skilled white
workers can be matched to rms both through the searches initiated by the workers and
22the rms. Now rst consider the steady state conditions for the postulated asymmetric
equilibrium. In this section, we use subscript W and B to denote group-W and group-B
related variables respectively.
Let HW and HB denote the fraction of skilled workers among white and black population
respectively, and let VW and VB denote the value of skill for white and black workers










Likewise, the vacancies steady state condition will now read:
2 (1   F) = 2FFHWW + (WHW + BHB)IF: (28)
The white and black unemployment rate steady state conditions are
2 (1   W) = WF (I + 2F) (29)
2 (1   B) = BFI: (30)
Now we characterize the relevant value functions in an asymmetric steady state. Let
!j;j 2 fB;Wg, be the expected wage of a skilled worker with race j; Zj be the present
value of a race-j employed skilled worker, VF be the present value of a vacant rm, and ZF;j
be the present value of a rm matched with a race-j skilled worker. We have the following
relationships:
(r + 2)Zj = !j + Vj;j 2 fB;Wg
(r + 2)ZF;j = j + VF;j 2 fB;Wg
(FI + r + )VB = FIZB
[F (I + 2F) + r + ]VB = F (I + 2F)ZW
Derivations similarly to those for the symmetric steady state yield the following value func-





(2F + I)FI (WHW + BHB)








F (2F + I)[2(r + 2) + FI]x
(r + )
(33)
23where x = !j + j, j 2 fB;Wg, is the total surplus, and
  2(r + 2)[(2F + I)(F + WHW) + I (F + BHB) + 2(r + 2)]
+FI (2F + I)(F + WHW + BHB):
A white asymmetric steady state is a list (HW;W;VW;HB;B;VB;F;VF) such that the
balance equations (26)-(30) and the value functions (31)-(33) hold. It can be veried that
in a white asymmetric steady state, black workers face a less attractive value of entering the
skilled labor market than do white workers (VB < VW); and thus fewer black workers than
white workers acquire skills (HB < HW): Black workers thus are at a disadvantage when
bargaining with rms; and as a result, rms obtain a larger surplus from black workers
(!B < !W and B > W): Given this pattern of surplus sharing, a vacant rm would prefer
to hire a black skilled worker than a white skilled worker (ZF;B > ZF;W). Moreover, since
it is postulated that rms are only searching for white skilled workers, it must be the case
that unemployment rate is higher among blacks than among whites (B > W):
However, in order for the postulated white asymmetric steady state to be consistent
with equilibrium, the rms must nd it optimal to only search the white workers. Let
VF (BjW) (VF (BWjW); respectively) be the value of a rm searching only black workers
(searching both black and white workers, respectively) if the other rms are all searching
only the white workers. It can be shown that they are respectively given by
VF (BjW) =
IWHWZF;W + (2F + I)BHBZF;B
IWHW + (2F + I)BHB + r + 
; (34)
VF (BWjW) =
(I + F)(WHWZF;W + BHBZF;B)
(I + F)(WHW + BHB) + r + 
: (35)
The condition for a white asymmetric steady state equilibrium is:
VF  maxfVF (BjW);VF (BWjW)g: (36)
Examining the expressions for VF;VF (BjW) and VF (BWjW) as given by (31), (34) and
(35), we can see that (36) can be true only if BHB < WHW in a white asymmetric
equilibrium. Since we already know that B > W in the asymmetric steady state, it thus
must be the case that HB < HW: That is, to be optimal for the rms to only search
for white workers in the white asymmetric equilibrium, there must be a suciently low
fraction of skilled black workers. That is, the postulated discriminatory search behavior of
the rms in favor of whites must generate a suciently strong supply side response on the
part of workers in their skill investment decisions in order for the rms' search behavior to
be optimal. The intuition is quite simple: in order for the rms not to search for blacks,
24knowing that in equilibrium the wages for black skilled workers are lower, it must be the
case that there are a lot fewer black skilled workers in order for the trade-o between a
larger surplus from each hired black worker and a smaller probability of nding such worker
to be in favor of not searching blacks.
Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked (2000) show that a sucient condition for a white
asymmetric equilibrium is that when rms' search intensity F is suciently large relative
to that of the search intensity of the workers I: The intuition for this result is as follows:
when rms' searches are responsible for suciently large fraction of the contacts between
rms and workers, a decision by the rms not to search the black workers will almost ensure
that skilled black workers would not nd employment and thus depressing their incentives
to acquire skills, which in turn justifying the rms' decision not to search the black workers.
This paper therefore shows how search friction might generate group inequality even when
employers have perfect information about their workers and would strictly prefer to hire
workers from the discriminated group.
4.3 Endogenous group formation
The models up to now assume that individuals' group identities are exogenous. In
some situations, group identity is not as immutable as one's skin color or gender, but is
dened by characteristics that are more amenable to change, albeit at costs. Fang (2001)
presents a model of discrimination with endogenous group formation, where he showed that
endogenous group formation and discrimination can in fact coexist, and the resulting market
segmentation in the discriminatory equilibrium may lead to welfare improvement. Relative
to Coate and Loury (1993a), Fang's model keeps their linear production technology, but
endogenizes group identity choices; in addition, wages are set endogenously  a la Moro and
Norman (2003a) (see Section 4.1).
Benchmark Model with No Group Choice. The benchmark is a model without
endogenous group choices. There are two (or more) rms, indexed by i = 1;2: They both
have a traditional (old) and a new technology at their disposal. Every worker can produce
1 unit of output with the traditional technology. Workers with some requisite skills can
produce xq > 1 units of outputs with the new technology, but those without the skills will
produce 0: We assume that the rms are risk neutral and maximize expected prots.
There is a continuum of workers of unit mass in the economy. Workers are heterogeneous
in their costs of acquiring the requisite skills for the new technology. Suppose for simplicity
that a worker is either a low cost type whose skill acquisition cost is cl or a high cost type
25with cost ch where 0 < cl < ch: The fractions of low cost and high cost workers are l
and h respectively with l + h = 1: A worker's cost type is her private information. It
is assumed that the workers are risk neutral and that they do not directly care about the
technology to which they are assigned.
To dramatize the market failure caused by informational free riding, suppose that it
is socially optimal for every worker to invest in skills and use the new technology, i.e.,
xq   ch > 1:
The timing of the game and the strategies of the players are as follows. First, workers,
observing their cost realization c 2 fcl;chg; decide whether or not to invest in skills, e :
fch;clg ! feq;eug: Firms do not perfectly observe a worker's investment decision, instead
they observe in the second stage a signal  2 [0;1] about each worker. The signal  is
distributed according to probability density function fq for qualied workers and fu for
unqualied ones. We assume that fq ()=fu () is strictly increasing in : In the third stage,
the rms compete in the labor market for workers by simultaneously announcing wage
schedules as functions of the test signal : A pure action of rm i at this stage is a mapping
wi : [0;1] ! <+: Workers then decide for which rm to work after observe wage schedules
w1 and w2. Finally, each rm allocates its available workers between the old and new
technologies using an assignment rule which is a mapping ti : [0;1] ! f0;1g, where ti () =
1 (respectively, 0) means that rm i assigns all workers with signal  to the new (respectively,
old) technology.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game is a list including the workers' skill investment
decision prole e and oer acceptance rules, and the rms' wage schedules and technology
assignment rules fwi ();ti ()g such that every player optimizes against other players' strat-
egy proles. Wages in equilibrium must be equal to workers' expected marginal product for
almost all  2 [0;1]; as in equation (19):








and the rms' equilibrium assignment rule must be t1 () = t2 ()  t(), where t() = 1
i for almost all  2 [0;1]
fq ()
fq () + (1   )fu ()
xq  1:
To analyze workers' skill investment decisions in Stage 1, note that the private benet of




w(;)[fq ()   fu ()]d:
26Because the private benet is a function of , there is informational free riding. In fact, the
informational free riding problem may lead to  = 0 being the unique equilibrium outcome.
Specically, dene l and h to be the sets of values of  that will respectively induce low
and high cost type workers to invest in the skills, that is, l  f 2 [0;1] : I ()  clg;h 
f 2 [0;1] : I ()  chg. Then it can be shown that any economy where l 6= ; and minl >
l; but h = ; will have a unique equilibrium with  = 0: The intuition is analogous to
a domino eect: h = ; implies that type-ch workers will never invest in skills, but the
presence of the high cost types dilutes the benet of skill investment for type-cl types.
Endogenous Group Choices and Discriminatory Equilibrium. Now suppose there
is an activity A that workers can undertake. Let V 2 < be a worker's utility (or disutility
if negative) in monetary terms from activity A: Therefore each worker now has two private
characteristics (c;V ). Let H (V jc) denote the cumulative distribution of V conditional on
the skill acquisition cost c: Importantly, assume that whether a worker undertakes activity
A is observable to rms. The dening characteristic of a cultural activity is that it is a priori
completely irrelevant to other economic fundamentals, which is captured by two assump-





 <; (2) A worker's test signal, and her qualication for the new
technology are not aected by whether she undertakes activity A. The game is expanded
to include one additional stage where a worker of type (c;V ) chooses j 2 fA;Bg; where
j = A means that she undertakes activity A and j = B that she does not. She derives
from activity A (dis)utility V if she chooses j = A; and zero utility otherwise: Write the




! fA;Bg: Workers who choose A will be
called A-workers, and those who choose B; B-workers.
Because of the a priori irrelevance of activity A we can suitably augment the equilibrium
decision rules of the basic model, and obtain an equilibrium of the augmented model in
which activity A plays no role in the rms' wage oer schedules and technology assignments.
The activity and skill acquisition choices in this type of equilibrium, dubbed \non-cultural
equilibrium," are pictured in Figure (4a). It is obvious that in the non-cultural equilibrium
no workers are skilled, hence the new technology is not adopted.
The introduction of the observable activity A allows the rms to potentially oer wage
schedules and technology assignment rules contingent on whether activity A is undertaken.
If rms do use this type of contingent wage schedules then workers may undertake activity
A for instrumental reasons. If A-workers are preferentially treated (in a manner to be made
precise below), then some workers who intrinsically dislike activity A may choose A to get
27the preferential treatment. Of course in equilibrium it must be rational for rms to give
preferential treatment to A-workers:
An A-cultural equilibrium is dened to be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the augmented
model in which a positive mass of A-workers are assigned to the new technology, while all
B-workers are assigned to the old technology. Now consider an A-cultural equilibrium.
Since B-workers are never assigned to the new technology, in this equilibrium the fraction
of the skilled among B-workers, denoted by B; must be zero. Furthermore in order for
some positive fraction of A-workers to be assigned to the new technology, the proportion
of the skilled among A-workers, denoted by A; must belong to the set l. An A-cultural
equilibrium exists i for some value A 2 l; the population will self-select the activity
choices such that the fraction of cl types among A-workers is exactly A:
As before, workers will still be paid their expected productivity. Therefore rm i's
sequentially rational wage oer schedule to B-workers, wB
i ; is:
wB
1 () = wB
2 () = w(0;) = 1 for all  2 [0;1]:
Suppose that the proportion of the skilled among A-workers is A: Then rm i's equilibrium
wage schedule to A-workers, wA
i ; is:
wA
1 () = wA
2 () = w(A;):




and that of an unskilled A-worker is WA
u (A) =
R 1
0 w(A;)fu ()d: We can prove, by
simple revealed preference arguments, that the activity and skill acquisition choice proles




eq if c = cl; V  1 + cl   WA
q (A)
eu otherwise




A if c = cl; V  1 + cl   WA
q (A)
A if c = ch; V  1   WA
u (A)
B otherwise.
Figure (4b) depicts the activity and skill acquisition choices in an A-cultural equilibrium
where we have dened ~ Vq (A) = 1 + cl   WA
q (A) and ~ Vu (A) = 1   WA
u (A) as the
threshold disutility values that respectively a skilled and an unskilled worker are willing to
incur to be a member of the elites. Note that WA
q (A)   WA















cl ch cl ch
(a) Non-cultural Equilibrium (b) A-cultural Equilibrium
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Figure 4: Activity and Skill Acquisition Choices: Fang (2001)
Since WA
u (A)  1 whenever there is a positive mass of A-workers assigned to the new
technology, we have:
~ Vq (A)  ~ Vu (A)  0: (38)
Inequality (38) establishes that in a cultural equilibrium, a single-crossing property of the
cultural activity is endogenously generated. More specically, let us denote the net benet
to undertake activity A for a skilled and an unskilled worker with the same utility type V
respectively by B (eq;V ;A) = V   ~ Vq (A) and B (eu;V ;A) = V   ~ Vu (A): Inequality (38)
yields that B (eq;V ;A) > B (eu;V ;A) for every type V: In other words, in any A-cultural
equilibrium, a skilled worker is more willing than an unskilled one to endure disutility from
activity A to be an elite, which in turn justies A-workers as elites. Undertaking activity
A becomes a signaling instrument for skilled workers due to the endogenously generated
single crossing property.
Fang (2001) provided the necessary and sucient condition for the existence of A-
cultural equilibria. For any A 2 l; dene the proportion of the skilled among A-workers






l(1 H(~ Vq(A)))+h(1 H(~ Vu(A))) if A 2 l
0 otherwise
where the numerator of the fraction is the total mass of skilled A-workers (see the shaded
29area in Figure 4b) and the denominator is the total mass of A-workers (the area marked
\A" in Figure 4b). Every xed point of the mapping 	 will correspond to an A-cultural
equilibrium. Notice that by segmenting the labor market into A-workers and B-workers
(by whether workers undertake the activity A;) it allows A-workers' skill investment choices
depend only on the rms' perception of the proportion of the skilled among A-workers,
instead of the rm's perception for the whole population as in the benchmark model. Let
  maxA2l [	(A)   A] be the maximal dierence between the function 	 and the
identity map. The necessary and sucient condition for the existence of at least one A-
cultural equilibrium is   0
Welfare. In a cultural equilibrium, the new technology is adopted by a positive mass
of workers. In the mean time, some workers are enduring the disutility of activity A in
order to be members of the elites. But, B-workers are exactly as well o as they are in the
non-cultural equilibrium. By revealed preferences, A-workers are strictly better o than
they are in the non-cultural equilibrium. Thus any cultural equilibrium Pareto dominates
the non-cultural equilibrium.
4.4 Group interactions from peer eects
An alternative source of cross-group interactions is studied by Chaudhuri and Sethi
(2008), who extended the standard Coate and Loury's framework assuming that the distri-
bution of the cost of investment in human capital G is a function of the mean peer group
skill level s, computed as follows:
sj = j + (1   ) ;j = B;W
Where   is the fraction of skilled workers in the whole population and  2 [0;1] measures
the level of segregation in the society. Positive spillover in human capital across groups is
reected in the assumption that G is increasing in sj. Although G is the same across groups,
the distribution of the cost of acquiring human capital for a given group is endogenous in
this model, and may be dierent across groups if groups experience dierent levels of peer
quality.
This parameterization allows the model to investigate the relationship between integra-
tion and discrimination. It shows that in some cases integration makes it impossible for
negative stereotypes to be sustained. To understand the intuition behind the main result,
assume that when groups are completely segregated they coordinate on dierent equilibria.
When integration increases, the peer group eect increases the cost of investment in the
30groups with high investment and decreases the cost of investment in the other group; hence
the direct eect is to equalize the fractions of people that invest. Inequality may persist
in equilibrium, but under some conditions if integration is strong enough multiplicity of
equilibria disappears and groups acquire the same level of human capital.
5 Dynamic models of discrimination
The literature on the dynamic evolutions of discrimination is relatively sparse. Antonovics
(2006) considers a dynamic model of statistical discrimination that accounts for intergen-
erational income mobility. She shows that when income is transmitted across generations
through parental investments in the human capital of children, statistical discrimination
can lead racial groups with low endowments of human capital to become trapped in in-
ferior stationary equilibria. Fryer (2007) considers a dynamic extension of the Coate and
Loury model, more specically the example that Coate and Loury used to illustrate the
potential for patronizing equilibrium with armative action as described in Section 6.2.2,
by introducing an additional promotion stage after workers are hired. He uses the extension
to ask how initial adversity in the hiring stage will aect the subsequent promotions for
those minorities who are able to be assigned a job in the rm. The intuition he formalizes
in the model can be termed as a possibility of \belief ipping." Specically, suppose that
an employer has negative stereotypes about a particular group, say the minorities, and
discriminates against them in the initial hiring practice, relative to another group, say the
majorities, for whom the employer has more positive stereotypes. Then, conditional on
being hired, the minority workers within the rm may be more talented than the majority
workers because they were held to a more exacting standard in the initial hiring. As a
result, minorities who are hired in the rm may be more likely to be promoted. Fryer's
(2007) analysis provides a set of sucient conditions for the \belief ipping" phenomenon
to arise.12
Blume (2006) presents an interesting dynamic analysis of statistical discrimination using
ideas from evolutionary game theory. This paper adds a learning dynamic to a simplied
version of Coate and Loury's static equilibrium model of statistical discrimination. The as-
signment of workers to rms and the opportunity for rms to experiment generate a random
data process from which rms learn about the underlying proportions of skilled workers in
12The ipping of the eect of race on the initial hiring probability and subsequent promotion probability
may be used as a basis to empirically distinguish statistical discrimination from taste-based discrimination.
Altonji and Pierret (1997) proposed and implemented a test of statistical discrimination based on the eect
of race on worker wages over time with employer learning.
31the population. Under two plausible, but exogenously specied learning dynamics, long-run
stable patterns of discrimination that appear in the data process can be characterized and
related to the equilibria of the static model. Blume (2006) shows that long-run patterns
of discrimination can be identied with particular equilibria. Although dierent patterns
corresponding to dierent equilibria are possible, generically only one will be salient for any
given specication of parameters.
Blume's (2006) dynamic model is cast in a discrete time setting where in each period,
a certain measure of new workers are born and they will have to make unobservable skill
investment decisions. A drawback of the discrete time setup is that there will be potential
multiple equilibria in the skill investment decisions within each cohort due to coordination
failure. Levin (2009) avoids this complication by considering a continuous time model where
in any instant only one new worker arrives with some probability, thus avoiding the issue of
equilibrium multiplicity resulting from coordination problems. As a result, the evolution of
the fraction of skilled workers in Levin (2009) is consistent with the optimal behavior of the
individuals. He showed that statistical discrimination equilibrium can be quite persistent
even if policies are enacted to improve access to resources for the disadvantaged minorities.
An alternative theory of discrimination based on a search and matching model of a mar-
riage market is provided by Eeckhout (2006). This paper generates endogenous segregation
in a dynamic environment where partners randomly match to play a repeated prisoner's
dilemma game.13 In this setup, the driving force behind inequality is the use of race as
a public randomization device. When cooperation is expected from same-match partners,
segregation outcomes might Pareto-dominate color-blind outcomes. Due to random match-
ing, mixed matches always occur in equilibrium, and there may be less cooperation in mixed
matches than in same-color matches, but, mixed matches may be of shorter duration.
6 Armative action
6.1 A brief historical background
Armative action policies were developed during the 1960s and 1970s in two phases that
embodied conicting traditions of government regulations.14 The rst phase, culminating
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1956, was shaped by the
13Fang and Loury (2005a, 2005b) explored a theory of dysfunctional collective identity in a repeated risk
sharing game.
14See Holzer and Neumark (2000) for a more detailed historical and institutional background of armative
actions in the U.S.
32presidency and the Congress and emphasized nondiscrimination under a \race-blind Con-
stitution." The second phase, shaped primarily by federal agencies and courts, witnessed a
shift toward minority preferences during the Nixon administration. The development of two
new agencies created to enforce the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission under Title VII and the Oce of Federal Contract Compliance under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act, demonstrates the tensions between the two regulatory traditions
and the evolution of federal policy from non-discrimination to minority preferences under
the rubric of armative action. The results has strengthened the economic and political
base of the civil rights coalition while weakening its moral claims in public opinion.
The main goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were \the destruction of legal segregation
in the South and a sharp acceleration in the drive for equal rights for women". Title VII,
known as the Fair Employment Commission Title or FEPC Title, of the Civil Rights Act
would create the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to police job dis-
crimination in commerce and industry with the intention to destroy the segregated political
economy of the South and enforce nondiscrimination throughout the nation. Title VI of
the Act, known as the Contract Compliance Title, \prohibits discrimination in programs
receiving funds from federal grants, loans or contracts." Contract compliance was backed
by the authority to cancel the contracts of failed performers and ban the contractors from
future contract work. The specter of bureaucrats telling businesses whom to hire under Ti-
tle VII was raised during the congressional debates prior to the passage of the Civil Rights
Act. The Senate majority leader of the time, Hubert Humphrey, promised to eat his hat if
the civil rights bill ever led to racial preferences. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed
by President Lyndon Johnson into law on 2 July.
But Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the sleeper that led to armative
action policies. In September 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246. This
order intended to create new enforcement agencies to implement Title VI in the Civil Rights
Act, and it repeated nondiscrimination. The Oce of Contract Compliance (OFCC) was
established by the Labor Department to implement Executive Order 11246. It designed a
model of contract compliance based on a metropolitan Philadelphia plan, which required
that building contractors submit \pre-award" hiring schedules listing the number of minori-
ties to be hired, with the ultimate goal to make the proportion of blacks in each trade equal
to their proportion of metropolitan Philadelphia's workforce (30%). This Philadelphia plan
was ruled in November 1968 to violate federal contract law. But in 1971 under the Nixon
administration, the Supreme Court armed that the minority preferences of the Philadel-
phia did not violate the Civil Rights Act. The EEOC, in charge of the implementation
33of Title VII, followed a similar strategy, issuing guidelines to employers to use statistical
proportionality in employee testing. In 1972, Congress extended the EEOC's jurisdiction
to state and local governments and educational institutions (which were exempt in 1964).
Armative action became the model of federal hiring practices.
The original rationale for armative action was to right the historical wrong of insti-
tutional racism and stressed its temporary nature. In 1978, in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, Supreme Court justice Harry Blackmun was apologetic about sup-
porting a government policy of racial exclusion: \I yield to no one in my earnest hope that
the time will come when an armative action program is unnecessary and is, in truth,
only a relic of the past." He expressed the hope that it is a stage of transitional inequality
and \within a decade at most, American society must and will reach a stage of maturity
where acting along this line is no longer necessary". Twenty ve years later, however, in her
opinion on the case Grutter v. Bollinger, justice Sandra Day O'Connor repeated a similar
rhetoric: \The Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."
6.2 Armative action in Coate and Loury (1993a)
Coate and Loury (1993a) analyzed how armative action in the form of an employment
quota may aect the incentives to invest in skills for both groups and the equilibrium of the
model. In particular, it highlights a potential perverse eect of armative action: in the
so-called \patronizing equilibrium," the incentives to invest in skills by the group A workers
{ the group that the armative action policy is supposed to help, may be reduced in the
equilibrium with armative action relative to that without armative action.
6.2.1 Modeling armative action
Coate and Loury (1993a) modeled armative action in terms of an employment quota.
Specically, the armative action policy requires that the proportion of group B workers
on the complex task (which pays a higher wage in their model) be equal to the proportion
of group B workers in the population. Recall from Section 3.2, the proportion of white
workers in the population is  2 (0;1). For expositional simplicity, we write W =  and
B = 1    below.
Suppose that the proportion of skilled workers are respectively B and W among groups

















34be the probability that the rms will assign a randomly selected worker from a group where a
fraction  invests in skills to the complex task if the rms use ~  as the assignment threshold.






























where in the armative action employment quota constraint (40), the left and right hand
sides are respectively the probabilities that a random White and Black worker will be
assigned to the complex task. Note that when these probabilities are equalized, the fraction
of blacks assigned to the complex task will indeed exactly match the fraction of blacks in
the population, as stipulated by the employment quota.15































The ideal for an armative action policy is to ensure that all equilibria under arma-
tive action entail homogeneous beliefs by the rms about the investment behavior of the
workers from the two groups and lead to a result of race-neutral task assignment decisions.
The negative stereotypes of the rms regarding the discriminated against group will be
eliminated by the armative action policy if rms hold homogeneous beliefs.
Coate and Loury (1993a) provide a sucient condition on the primitives, albeit rather




















is dened in (14), denote the fraction of a group assigned to the complex
task if the rms use ~  as the assignment threshold. The armative action employment

















not necessarily imply ~ W = ~ B because ^ () may not be monotonic (as illustrated in the
next section regarding \patronizing equilibrium"). How ^ () varies with ~  depends on the
interaction of two distinct eects. On the one hand, an increase in the threshold ~  makes
it harder to be assigned to the complex task for a given fraction of qualied workers, thus
leading to a decrease of ^ ; on the other hand, as ~  increases, the workers' skill investment
incentives change, leading to changes in the fraction of qualied workers. The net eect is
15Assuming a law of large numbers holds in this setup
35typically ambiguous. However, ^ () must be decreasing over some part of the domain [0;1]
because ^ (0) = 1 and ^ (1) = 0: Thus a sucient condition under which all equilibria under
armative action entail homogeneous beliefs about the two groups is that ^ () as dened
in (41) is decreasing on [0;1]:
6.2.2 Patronizing equilibrium: an example
Coate and Loury (1993a) provided an example to demonstrate the possibility of pa-
tronizing equilibria under armative action. The idea is very simple: to comply with the
armative action policy (assuming B < W is unchanged by the policy for the moment),
the standards for blacks must be lowered and the standards for whites must be raised to
comply with the employment quota. Thus, it is now easier for blacks to be assigned to the
good job (and harder for whites) irrespective of whether or not a particular worker invested
in skills. Since the incentives to invest depend on the expected wage dierence if one is
skilled versus if one is unskilled, whether the above change will increase or decrease blacks'
incentive to invest in skills depends on the particularities of the distributions fq and fu:
Consider the following example. Suppose that the skill investment cost c is uniform











u if  2 [0;u]
0 otherwise,
(43)
where u > q: Figure 5 graphically illustrates these two distributions, which are equivalent
to the case in which only three test results are possible. If  > u; then the signal is only
possible if the worker is qualied, thus we call it a \pass" score; if  < q; then the signal is
only possible if the worker is unqualied, thus we call it a \fail" score; if  2 [q;u]; then
the signal is possibly from both a qualied and an unqualied worker, thus we call such a
signal \unclear".
Equilibria without Armative Action. Let us rst analyze the equilibrium of this
example with no armative action. Clearly the rm assigns workers with a \pass" score
to the complex task and those with \fail" score to the simple task. Now we determine the
optimal assignment decision regarding workers with \unclear" scores. It is clear from Figure
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Figure 5: Signal distributions in Coate and Loury's (1993) example of patronizing equilib-
rium










Suppose that the prior that a worker is qualied is : Then the posterior probability that
a worker with an unclear score is qualied is, by Bayes' rule,
 () =
pq
pq + (1   )pu
: (46)
Hence the employer will assign a worker with unclear scores to the complex task if and only
if
 ()xq   [1    ()]xu  0;
or equivalently,




We say that a rm follows a liberal policy for group j if it assigns all group j workers
with an unclear test score to the complex task, i.e. if ~  = q; we say that a rm follows a
conservative policy for group j if it assigns all group j workers with an unclear test score
to the simple task, i.e. if ~  = u:
37In order for a liberal policy to be consistent with equilibrium, it must be the case that
the skill investment incentives under the liberal policy will result in the fraction of qualied
workers in the group to be larger than ^  dened in (47). Note that under a liberal policy,
the benet from skill investment is given by
I (q) = ! (1   pu)
because if he is skilled, he will be assigned with probability one to the complex task and if
he is unskilled, the probability is pu: Thus the proportion of skilled workers in response to
a liberal policy is
l = I (q) = ! (1   pu): (48)
Thus the liberal policy is an equilibrium if l > ^ :
Similarly, under a conservative policy, the benet of skill investment is
I (u) = ! (1   pq):
Hence the proportion of skilled workers in response to a conservative policy is
c = I (u) = ! (1   pq): (49)
Thus the conservative policy is an equilibrium if c < ^ :
To summarize, in the absence of the armative action constraint, if c < ^  < l; then
the example admits multiple equilibria in that both the liberal policy and the conservative
policy could be equilibria. Suppose that the blacks and the whites are coordinated on the
conservative and the liberal equilibria respectively, i.e., (B;W) = (c;l). Clearly, in this
equilibrium, rms hold a negative stereotype toward blacks because c < l:
Equilibria with Armative Action. Suppose that the economy is in an equilibrium
characterized by (B;W) = (c;l) described above, and suppose that an armative
action policy in the form of employment quota as described in Section 6.2.1 is imposed.16
Given that in the pre-armative action equilibrium (B;W) = (c;l), there is a
higher fraction of whites on the complex job. In order to comply with the armative action
employment quota, the rm must either assign more blacks or assign fewer whites to the
complex task. Which course of action is preferred will depend on the following calculations.
Given (B;W) = (c;l); if the rm assigns a black worker with a \fail" score to the
16It can be veried that the sucient condition for armative action to eliminate discriminatory equilib-
rium described in the previous section does not hold in this example.
38complex task, it loses xu unit of prots; however, if the rm assigns a white worker with
an \unclear" score to the simple task (instead of the complex task as stipulated under the
liberal policy), it loses
 (l)xq   [1    (l)]xu;
where  () is dened in (46). Notice that if
[lxq   (1   l)xu] > (1   )xu;
then the rm would rather put all black workers with \fail" scores to the complex task
than to switch white workers with \unclear" scores to the simple task in order to satisfy
the employment quota.
Now consider the following assignment policies. For the whites, keep the original liberal
policy, namely, assign all workers with \pass" or \unclear" scores to the complex task.
Under this policy, the white workers' skill investment decisions in equilibrium will lead to
W = l; same as before. For the black workers, the rms follow the following \patronizing"
assignment policy: assign all black workers with \pass" or \unclear" scores to the complex
task, and with probability (B) 2 (0;1) assign blacks with \fail" scores to the complex





The rms are \patronizing" the blacks in this postulated assignment policy because they
are assigning blacks who have \fail" scores to the complex task.
Now consider a black worker's best response if he anticipates being patronized with
probability . If he invests in skills, he will be assigned to the complex task with probability
1; if he does not invest, he will be assigned to the complex task with probability pu +
(1   pu). Thus, the return from investing in skills for a black worker is:
! f1   [pu + (1   pu)]g = ! (1   )(1   pu) = (1   )l
where the last equality follows from (48).
Hence any (B;l), where l > 1=2; can be sustained as an equilibrium under armative
action policy where rms follow a patronizing assignment policy (B) for blacks and a
17That is, to satisfy
l + (1   l)pu = B + (1   B)[pu + (1   pu)(B)]:
39liberal policy for whites if and only if B  l and B satises




Note that equation (51) admits two solutions for B : B = l or B = 1   l: In the rst
solution, color-blind equilibrium is reached and the employer is liberal toward both groups
(at B = l; it can be seen from (50) that (B) = 0; thus there is no patronizing). In the
second solution, the rms continue to view black workers as less productive in equilibrium
and adopt a patronizing assignment policy on the blacks in order to fulll the armative
action employment quotas.
Dynamics. Coate and Loury (1993a) further argued that, under a plausible dynamics on
















with initial condition that 0
B = c; it can be shown using a simple phase diagram that
t
B ! 1   l as t ! 1: Thus in some sense, not only is the patronizing equilibrium
possible, it could actually be a stable equilibrium outcome. Coate and Loury (1993b)
studied the eect of armative action in a similar environment, but where employers also
hold prejudicial preferences against minorities. In that case, it is shown that a gradual policy
in which representation targets are gradually increased might be more likely to eliminate
disparities than radical policies demanding immediate proportional representation.
6.3 General equilibrium consequences of armative action
One weakness of Coate and Loury (1993a)'s model is that wages are not determined in
a competitive labor market, but are xed exogenously. Because armative action policies
change the protability of hiring workers from dierent groups, this is not an innocuous
assumption. Moreover, workers from the discriminated group face a more favorable task
assignment rule, but, conditional on the signal, receive the same wages as before, therefore
armative action can only be a benet to them.
Moro and Norman (2003a) study the eect armative action policies in the general
equilibrium setting analyzed in Section 4.1, where wages are determined endogenously by
rms engaged in Bertrand competition for workers. Their analysis conrms the perverse
40incentive eects of government-mandated policies found by Coate and Loury (1993a). More-
over, it nds perverse eects on equilibrium wages and proves that in some circumstances
armative action may hurt its intended beneciaries.
The armative action constraint is the same as that assumed in Section 6.2.1, that
is, employers are forced to hire the same proportion of workers from both groups in the
complex task (and, residually, in the simple task). Employers therefore solve the following
problem (assuming for simplicity that groups have identical size):
max
~ B;~ W



















s.t. BFq(~ B) + (1   B)Fu(~ B) = WFq(~ W) + (1   W)Fu(~ W)
Denote b j(); j = B;W the optimal group-specic cuto rules that solve this problem
for a given vector  = (B;W). Employers assign all workers with signal above such
thresholds to the complex task, and all other workers to the simple task. Observe that
from the constraint, it follows directly that if B < W then b B() > b W(): The direct
(partial-equilibrium) eect of the policy on the task assignment rule is to force employers to
lower the task assignment threshold for the discriminated group, and to raise the threshold
for the dominant group. It can be proved that the equilibrium wages are:
b wj(;) =
(
p(b j();j)xq(b C; b S) for  < b j()
p(;j)xq(b C; b S) for   b j()
(52)
where b C; b S are the optimal inputs of the production function computed from the opti-
mization problem satisfying the armative action constraint, xq and xu are the marginal
products of workers in the complex and simple task, and p(;j) is the probability that a
worker with signal  is qualied, given by (4). This result says that the wage is a continu-
ous function of the signal, that workers in the complex task are paid exactly their marginal
products, and that workers in the simple task are paid the wage of the marginal worker. In
the simple task, workers are therefore paid above the marginal product if they belong to
the dominant group, and below their marginal product if they belong to the discriminated
group. Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium wages under the assumption B < W:
The proof of this result rst argues that wages must be continuous, otherwise one
employer could exploit the discontinuity and increase prot by oering a slightly higher
wage to workers that are cheaper near the discontinuity, and zero to workers that are
more expensive. Second, note that there is a dierence between quantity of workers in
the complex task and their labor input, because not all workers employed in the complex
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Figure 6: Equilibrium wage schedules under armative action in Moro and Norman (2003)
task are productive. If workers in the complex task were not paid their expected marginal
product, then employers could generate a protable deviation that exploits the dierence
between quantity of workers and quantity of eective inputs.18 But because of continuity,
this implies that workers in the simple task are paid above or below the marginal product
depending on their group identity. It is not dicult to show from the rst order condition
of the task assignment problem that the average pay of all workers in the simple task (from
both groups) is exactly the marginal product xu(b C; b S):







b wj()fu(); j = B;W (53)
and the equilibria are characterized by the solution to the system of xed-point equations
j = G(Ij()); j = B;W where as usual G is the CDF of the cost of human capital
investment. Any symmetric equilibrium of the model without the policy trivially satises
the armative action constraint and therefore is also an equilibrium under armative
action.
The full equilibrium eects of armative action are indeterminate. While it is possible
that imposing armative action completely eliminates asymmetric equilibria, it is also
possible for asymmetric equilibria to exist that satisfy the quota imposed by the policy for
reasons similar to those illustrated by the patronizing equilibria derived in Section 6.2.2. A
proof may be derived by construction xing fundamentals y, fq and fu, and looking for a
cost of investment distribution G that satises the equilibrium conditions under armative
action. Note that if B = 0, and 0 < W < 1; then from (52) and (53) it must be
that IB(0;W) = 0 < IW(0;W) (all group-B workers are oered zero wage, equivalent
18The reader is invited to consult the proof in the original paper for details.
42to their productivity in the complex task but some are employed in the complex task to
satisfy the armative action constraint). But then since Ij () is continuous and initially
increasing near B = 0, one can nd B > 0 such that 0 < B < W < 1 and, at the same
time, 0 < IB(B;W) < IW(B;W): Hence one can nd a strictly increasing CDF G such
that G(0) > 0; G(IB(B;W)) = B; and G(IW(B;W)) = W so that (B;W) is an
equilibrium of the model.
In general, comparing outcomes with and without the policy is dicult because outcomes
depend on the equilibrium selection. It is possible to show that the policy may have negative
welfare eects for its intended beneciaries. The negative direct eects on the discriminated
group's wages are evident from Figure 6. The picture however hides the full equilibrium
eects because factor ratios will change in equilibrium. Unless such factor ratios do not
change signicantly, expected earnings for group-B decrease. Note also from the gure
that the direct eect of the policy is to increase incentives to invest for the discriminated
group. This tends to moderate the negative wage eects, but unless this eect is signicant,
workers in the discriminated groups are made worse-o by the policy.
The wage determination in this model is specic to the modeling assumptions made
regarding production and information technologies. In this simplied setting, a slightly
more complex policy that combines armative action employment quota and racial equality
of average wages in each task would be eective in inducing symmetric equilibria. It is not
clear, however, whether such a policy would be easily implementable in a more complex
environment.19 Nevertheless, the model is useful to illustrate that armative action policies
have non trivial general equilibrium eects.
6.4 Armative action in a two-sector general equilibrium model
Fang and Norman (2006) derive similar, but more clear-cut, perverse results in a two-
sector general equilibrium model motivated by the following puzzling observation from
Malaysia. Since its independence from British colonial rule in 1957, Malaysia protected the
Malays by entitling them to certain privileges including political power, while at the same
time allowing the Chinese to pursue their economic objectives without interference. This
relative racial harmony was rejected in 1970 when the so-called New Economic Policy was
adopted, in which wide-ranging preferential policies favoring the Malays were introduced,
19Lundberg (1991), for example, describes how companies may use variables that are correlated with race
to evade the imposition of policies that monitor the employment process, such as armative action. In that
setting, it is shown that policies monitoring outcomes may be more eective in reducing inequality, at the
cost of higher production losses from workers' misallocation.
43most important of which is an eective mandate that only the Malays can access the rel-
atively well-paid public sector jobs. However, despite the aggressive preferential policies
favoring the Malays, the Malay did not achieve signicant economic progress relative to the
Chinese; if anything, the opposite seems to be true, that is, the new policy reversed the
pre-1970 trend of the narrowing wage gaps between the Chinese and the Malays.
Fang and Norman (2006) considered the following simple model. Consider an economy
with two sectors, called respectively the private and the public sector. The private sector
consists of two (or more) competitive rms, indexed by i = 1;2: Firms are risk neutral and
maximize expected prots, and are endowed with a technology that is complementary to
workers' skills. A skilled worker can produce x > 0 units of output, and an unskilled one
will, by normalization, produce 0:
The public sector oers a xed wage g > 0 to any worker who is hired, but there
is rationing of public sector jobs: the probability of getting hired in the public sector if a
worker applies is given by j 2 [0;1]; where j 2 fA;Bg is the worker's ethnic identity. In our
analysis below, we treat j as the government's policy parameter. Government-mandated
discriminatory policies are simply modeled by the assumption that A 6= B: Workers who
apply for but are unsuccessful in obtaining public sector employment can return to and
obtain a job in the private sector without waiting.
For each ethnic group j 2 fA;Bg; there is a continuum of workers with mass j in the
economy. Workers are heterogeneous in their costs, denoted by c; of acquiring the requisite
skills for the operation of the rms' technology. The cost c is private information of the
worker and is distributed according to a uniform [0;1] distribution in the population of both
groups. Workers are risk neutral and do not care directly about whether they work in the
public or private sector. If a worker of cost type c receives wage w; her payo is w   c if
she invests in skills, and w if she does not invest.
The events in this economy are timed as follows: In the rst stage, each worker in
group j with investment cost c 2 [0;1] decides whether to invest in the skills. This binary
decision is denoted by s 2 f0;1g where s = 0 stands for no skill investment and s = 1 for
skill acquisition. If a worker chooses s = 1; we say that she becomes qualied and hence
she can produce  units of output in the private sector; otherwise she is unqualied and
will produce 0: As in the other models surveyed in this section, skill acquisitions are not
perfectly observed by the rms, but in the second stage the worker and the rms observe a
noisy signal  2 fh;lg   about the worker's skill acquisition decision with the following
distributions:
Pr[ = hjs = 1] = Pr[ = ljs = 0] = p > 1=2:
44In the third stage, after observing the noisy signal , each worker decides whether to apply
for the public sector job. If applying, she is accepted for employment in the public sector
with probability j where j is her ethnic identity. If she did not get employed in the public
sector, she will, in the fourth stage, return to the private sector, where rms compete for
her service by posting wage oers. After observing the wage oers, she decides which rm
to work for, clearing the private sector labor market.
The key insight from Fang and Norman (2006) is that group j's incentives to invest in
skills depends on the probability that they may receive the public sector employment j: To
see this, suppose that at the end of the rst stage, a proportion j of the group j population
is qualied. Then in the second stage, a total measure pj + (1   p)(1   j) of workers
receives signal h; among which a measure pj is qualied and a measure (1   p)(1   j)
is unqualied. Similarly, a total measure (1   p)j + p(1   j) of workers receives signal
l; among which a measure (1   p)j is qualied and a measure p(1   j) is unqualied.
Therefore, in the fourth stage, when a rm sees a group j worker with a signal ; its posterior
belief that this worker is qualied, denoted by Pr[s = 1j;j] where  2 fh;lg; is given by
Pr[s = 1j = h;j] =
pj
pj+(1 p)(1 j)
Pr[s = 1j = l;j] =
(1 p)j
(1 p)j+p(1 j);
exactly as if there were no public sector. Hence, the equilibrium wage for group j workers
with signal  2 fh;lg when the proportion of qualied workers in group j is j; denoted by
w (j); is
wh (j) =  Pr[s = 1j = h;j] =
pj
pj+(1 p)(1 j)
wl (j) =  Pr[s = 1j = l;j] =
(1 p)j
(1 p)j+p(1 j):
Now we analyze the public sector job application decision in the third stage. A group
j worker with signal  applies to the public sector job if w (j) < g and does not apply if
w (j) > g where g is the public sector wage. Dening ^  as the solution to w (^ ) = g
for  2 fh;lg; i.e.,
^ h =
g (1   p)
g (1   p) + p(   g)
; ^ l =
gp
gp + (1   p)(   g)
:
We can conclude that a group j worker with signal  applies for a public sector job if and
if j  ^ :
A worker's incentive to acquire skills in the rst stage comes from the subsequent ex-
pected wage dierential between a qualied and an unqualied worker. With some algebra it





45is equal to the gain in expected wage from skill investment in the rst stage relative to not









(2p   1)(1   j)[wh (j)   wl (j)] if 0   < ^ h
(2p   1)

(1   j)[wh (j)   wl (j)] + j [wh (j)   g]
	
if ^ h   < ^ l
(2p   1)[wh (j)   wl (j)] if ^ l    1:
(54)




; depends also on j; the probability of public
sector employment for group j workers, which is the reason for a government-mandated pref-
erential (or discriminatory) policy in the public sector to matter for the private sector labor
market in our model. Indeed, a higher probability of public sector jobs will unambiguously










 (2p   1)[wh (j)   wl (j)] < 0 if j < ^ h
(2p   1)[wl (j)   g] < 0 if ^ h  j < ^ l
0 otherwise.
(55)
The intuition is simple: the public sector does not give any advantage to qualied workers
over unqualied workers. As a result, a higher j always reduces the equilibrium level of
j:
Now consider an economy where a minority ethnic group, say group A; is subject to
government-mandated discrimination in the sense that A = 0; while the majority native
group, group B; obtains public sector jobs with probability B > 0: Fang and Norman (2006)
show that the discriminated group A nevertheless may be economically more successful than
the preferred group B. Specically, when the government marginally increases B from 0;
there is a direct eect because now group B will have a higher degree of access to a higher
paying public sector and they will less likely enter the private sector. If the public sector
wage g is higher than the best private sector wage (i.e. g > p), as assumed, this direct
eect is a positive for group B: However, there is also a negative indirect general equilibrium
eect because as B increases from 0; it also reduces the incentives of skill investment, which
will in turn lower the expected wages in the private sector for group B. If g is not too high
(i.e. g < 4p(1   p)), then the expected wage of both qualied and unqualied group
A workers are higher than those of respective group B workers if A = 0 and B > 0 is
suciently small. Note that to satisfy the condition p < g < 4p(1   p), the precision
of the test signal p has to be less than 3=4: That the precision in the signal cannot be too
high for the negative indirect eect to dominate should be intuitive: a benecial net eect
from being excluded from the public sector can only occur if the informational free riding
46problem in the private sector is severe enough; and the higher p; the less severe this problem
is. It can also be shown that, under the same set of assumptions, not only group B workers
have lower expected wages, but also group B workers of all skill investment cost types are
economically worse o than their group A counterparts.
6.5 Role model eects of armative action
Advocates of armative action have often argued that larger representation of minorities
in higher paying jobs and occupations can generate role models that can positively inuence
future generations of minorities in their investment decisions. Chung (2000) formalizes these
arguments. Consider a group of individuals who dier in their costs of investment, which
take on two possible values cl or ch with cl < ch. In the population, a fraction  2 (0;1) is
of type cl: An individual's skill investment cost is her private information.
Each individual, upon learning her investment cost type c; makes a binary investment
decision. The skill investment decision aects the probability that the individual will obtain
a higher paying job. For simplicity, suppose that there are two kinds of jobs, a complex job
that pays w and a simple job whose wage is normalized to 0: Suppose that w > ch > cl > 0:
If an individual invests in skills, then she will obtain the complex job with probability
p that is drawn from a two-point distribution fp1;p2g with 0 < p1 < p2 < 1: Specically, p
follows a discrete-time Markov process as follows. The probability that p = p1 in period 0 is
equal to q0, and q0 is common knowledge among all individuals; the transition probability
Pr(pt+1 = pjjpt = pi) is given in Table 2 where both 12 and 21 lie in (0;1=2):
ptpt+1 p1 p2
p1 1   12 12
p2 21 1   21
Table 2: Transition matrix of the probability of being hired to the complex job
Suppose that in each period, one individual makes an investment decision and then
receives a job placement. All individuals observe the prior job placements of others, but do
not observe their investment decisions.
To characterize the equilibrium investment decisions of the agents, the key is to charac-
terize how the individuals' beliefs about the state of the labor market, whether p is equal
to p1 or p2; evolve over time. The role model eect in this model refers to the phenomenon
that a placement of a minority candidate in the high paying complex job will increase sub-
sequent minorities' belief that the labor market condition for skilled workers is in state p2;
47and as a result subsequent minorities' incentives to invest in skills increase.
Consider the rst individual. Suppose that her belief about the state of the labor market
at period 0 being p = p1 is q0: Assume for simplicity that the skill investment costs cl and
ch are such that, at the belief that p = p1 with probability q0; an individual with investment
cost cl will invest in skills, but an individual with cost ch will not. Moreover, consider a
situation following a long history of individuals being placed on the simple job, and as a
result the population's belief about the labor market being poor, i.e., p = p1, is at a steady
state q 2 (0;1). That is, if another individual is observed to be placed on the simple job,
the subsequent individual's belief about p = p1 will stay at q:20
In the above situation, suppose that the n-th individual is the very rst one who manages
to land a complex job. Upon observing this, the (n + 1)-st individual will now infer that
the n-th individual had invested and thus must have had low skill investment cost. The
posterior belief of the (n + 1)-st individual that the state of the labor market in period n is
p = p1 is
qn =
[q (1   12) + (1   q)21]p1
[q (1   12) + (1   q)21]p1 + [q12 + (1   q)(1   21)]p2
:
It can be shown with some algebra that qn < q; that is, upon the observation of a placement
on the complex job, the future individuals' belief about the labor market improves. The
n-th individual, upon being placed on the complex job, becomes a role model for future
individuals. If ch is not too high, this improvement in the belief may lead to those individuals
with investment cost ch to invest in skills as well. Thus a role model may lead to real changes
in behavior among future generations. Chung (2000) also analyzed how long the role model
eect may last.
However, if the role model eect is indeed an informational phenomenon, then once
armative action is announced the beliefs of the disadvantaged group regarding the labor
market should switch to p = p2; thus there is no additional information about p being
conveyed by preferential hiring in favor of the disadvantaged group. Hence,. a standard role-
model argument in favor of armative action is not supported when role-model eects are
purely informational. Chung (2000) observes that only when the hiring of minorities have
some payo-relevant eect than anti-discriminatory policies can have a bite, for example
when jobs require race-specic know-how, and there are so few minorities employed in
positions requiring skills that the returns to such skills are uncertain among minorities.
20Specically, q
 solves the unique root in (0;1) for the following quadratic equation:
(p2   p1)(1   12   21)q
2 + [(12 + 21)(1   p1)   (1   21)(p2   p1)]q   21 (1   p1) = 0:
The exact value of q
 can be easily derived from a steady state condition, and its expression is omitted here.
486.6 Color sighted vs. color blind armative action
6.6.1 Recent developments in the armative action policies related to
college admission
Race-conscious armative action policies in college admission came under a lot of
scrutiny ever since the landmark case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
(1978) where the Supreme Court upheld diversity in higher education as a \compelling
interest" and held that \race or ethnic background may be deemed a `plus' in a particu-
lar applicant's le" in university admissions, and at the same time ruled that quotas for
underrepresented minorities violates the equal protection clause. In 1996 case Hopwood v.
Texas the Court banned any use of race in school admissions in Texas. To accommodate
the ruling, the State of Texas passed a law guaranteeing entry to any state university of a
student's choice if they nished in the top 10% of their graduating class.
Also in 1996, Proposition 209 was passed in California, which mandates that \the state
shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group
on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public em-
ployment, public education, or public contracting."21 Proposition 209 essentially prohibits
public colleges and universities in California from using race in any admission or nancial
aid decision. From 2001, the top 4 percent of high school seniors are guaranteed admis-
sion to any University of California campus under California's Eligibility in Local Context
plan. In 1998, Washington state voters overwhelmingly passed Initiative 200, which is al-
most identical to California's Proposition 209. Florida passed its Talented 20 plan which
guaranteed Florida high school students who graduate in the top 20 percent of their class
admissions to any of the 11 public universities within the Florida State University System.
Two 2003 Supreme Court cases on armative action in admissions are related to the
University of Michigan. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court upheld the armative
action admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School. The Court's majority
ruling, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, held that the United States Constitution
\does not prohibit the law school's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions
to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benets that ow from a
diverse student body." In Gratz v. Bollinger, on the other hand, the Supreme Court ruled
that \the University [of Michigan]'s policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, or
one-fth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single `underrepresented
minority' applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational
21See http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/209text.htm
49diversity." On the one hand, the court armed that the use of race in admission decision is
not unconstitutional, but at the same time, in the second case, the court specied that any
automatic use of race in the computation of a scoring system used in determining admissions
violates the constitution.
6.6.2 Color sighted vs. color blind armative action with exogenous skills
Chan and Eyster (2003) studied the eect of color blind armative action policies on
the quality of admitted students when colleges have preferences for diversity.
Applicants. Consider a college who must admit a fraction C of applicants. The applicants
belong to two groups, black (B) and white (W); with measure B and W respectively such
that B + W = 1: Suppose that the test scores of the applicants (also exchangeably
the quality of the applicants), denoted by t 2 [t; t]; in group j 2 fB;Wg is drawn from
distributions fj (), such that
R  t
t fj (t)dt = 1: Suppose that black applicants tend to have
lower test scores than white applicants.22 Specically, assume that the distributions fW ()
and fB () satisfy the following strict monotone likelihood ratio property:
Assumption 2. fW (t)=fB (t) is continuously dierentiable and strictly increasing in t
for t 2 (t; t):
A key implication of this assumption is that higher test scores are more likely coming
from white applicants.
Admissions. The admission oce observes the applicants' test scores and their group
identities, and makes admission decisions subject to the constraint that the fraction of
applicants admitted must equal the capacity of the university C: Formally, an admission
rule is (rB;rW); where rj (t) : [t; t] ! [0;1]; j 2 fB;Wg is the probability that a group
j member with test score t is accepted, such that tj () is weakly increasing in t. The
admissible admission rules depend on whether armative action is allowed. If it is allowed,
then rj (t) can depend on j; if it is not allowed, then rB (t) = rW (t) for all t 2 [t; t]: For
simplicity, let Nj (r) = j
R  t
t rj (t)fj (t)dt denote the number of group j applicants admitted
under rule r:
22See Fryer and Loury (2008), discussed below, for a model that links the distributions of test scores to
ex ante investment eorts.
50The admission oce's preference is postulated as a weighted average of the total test














where  > 0 captures the admission oce's taste for diversity; in particular, the university
desires to achieve a racial composition in the student body that is identical to the racial
composition of the applicant pool. Note that under (56) the admission oce wants to
achieve racial diversity whether or not the admission rules have to be color blind or are
allowed to be color sighted.
The admission oce chooses hrB (t);rW (t)i among admissible set of admission rules to






rj (t)fj (t)dt = C: (57)
It is clear that restricting the admission oce to color blind admission rules will neces-
sarily lower its attainable payo; the goal of the analysis is to show how such color-blindness
restriction aects the constrained optimal admission rules, and how it aects the test scores
of admitted students, i.e., the rst term in (56).
Color Sighted Armative Action. When color sighted armative action is admissible,
the admission oce sets a cuto rule for each group and admits any applicants scoring above
her group's cuto. Let (t
B;t
W) denote the admission test score threshold for black and white
applicants respectively. If we ignore the absolute-value sign in the objective function (56),















subject to the capacity constraint. If the solution to the above modied problem has the
minority group underrepresented, then ignoring the absolute-value sign is not consequential
and the solution also solves the original problem. The rst order conditions for the above





If under such thresholds (tB;tW); minorities are indeed underrepresented, then we have a
solution. If minorities are overrepresented, then the solution to the original problem will be
51thresholds that exactly achieve proportional representation. Thus, given Assumption 2, the
optimal color sighted admission rule is a cuto rule (t
B;t
W) such that 0  t
W  t
B  =C.
Blacks are weakly underrepresented:
Color Blind Armative Action. A ban on color sighted armative action would re-
quire that the same admission rule be used for both groups. Thus the strict monotone
likelihood ratio property would necessarily imply that the minority group will be under-
represented among the admitted students as long as the admission rule is increasing in













: Dropping the constant B and using the fact that NB (r) = B
R  t
t r(t)fB (t)dt;













r(t)fj (t)dt = C
where




BfB (t) + WfW (t)
(59)
The function  dened above represents the increase in the admission oce's utility from ad-
mitting a candidate with test score t: The rst term is its utility from the test score itself, and
the second term reects its taste for diversity. Note that the likelihood that a test score of t is
coming from a black applicant is given by the likelihood ratio BfB (t)=[BfB (t) + WfW (t)]:
The admission oce obviously would like to ll its class with applicants with the highest
value of : When  is everywhere increasing in t; it can simply use a threshold rule. The
problem is that  might not be monotonic in t: To see this, note that the monotone likeli-
hood ratio property implies that the second term in the expression  () in (59) is strictly
decreasing in t; but, in general, nonlinearly, which implies that  might not be monotonic.
If  () is not everywhere increasing in t; the admission oce is not able to admit its
favorite applicants without violating the constraint that r() must be increasing in t: Chan
and Eyster (2003) provides a useful characterization for the optimal color blind admission
rule in this case. To describe their characterization, dene  (t1;t2) as the average value of








t1 [BfB(t)+WfW(t)]dt for t1 < t2
 (t1) for t1 = t2:
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quality to achieve it. We  shall focus on this 
case, which best describes most elite American 
colleges and universities. 
ASSUMPTION 2: 0  <  a/C  <  tw -  tN. 
COROLLARY  1: Given  Assumptions  1 and 2, 
tK  <  t*,  but the minority group is  strictly 
underrepresented.  Moreover,  tw  -  tN  =  a/C. 
When  the  minority group  is  underrepre- 
sented, the value of the marginal  majority  can- 
didate  is her test score, t*,  and the value of the 
marginal minority candidate is  her test score 
plus her positive effect on diversity, t*  +  (a/ 
C). Under the optimal rule, the admissions of- 
fice is indifferent  between marginal  candidates 
from the two groups. 
III. A Ban on Affirmative  Action 
When affirmative  action is banned, the ad- 
missions office must use a rule that treats the 
two groups identically. Let RNA  be the set of 
such admissions rules; since a rule in RNA  de- 
pends only on test score, we  drop the group 
subscript  and refer to such a rule as r(t).  As- 
sumption 1 (SMLRP)  implies that, so long as r 
is increasing  in t, the minority  group  is weakly 
underrepresented.  Thus,  we  can  ignore  the 
absolute-value sign in the admissions office's 
objective function and drop the constant term 
(aN)/C  to rewrite  the admissions  office's prob- 
lem as 
t 
(6)  max  r(t)3y(t)(n(t) + w(t)) dt 
r E  A  g  t 
t 
(7)  s.t.  r(t)(n(t)  + w(t)) dt =  C, 
t 
where  y(t)  =  t  +  (a/C)(n(t)/(n(t)  +  w(t))). 
The function y represents the increase in the 
admissions  office's utility from admitting  a can- 
didate with test score t. It incorporates  the ad- 
missions  office's  taste  for  diversity: ceteris 
paribus, the higher is the share of  candidates 
scoring t from the minority  group,  the more the 
admissions office likes candidates  scoring t. 
t  tm  ta  tb  t 
FIGURE  1.  ADMISSIONS OFFICE'S  PREFERENCES OVER TEST 
SCORES  UNDER  A BAN 
The admissions office would like to fill its 
class with candidates  with the highest 3y.  When 
3y  is everywhere  increasing  in t, it simply uses a 
threshold  rule. However, 3y  might not be mono- 
tone in t. When the share  of candidates  belong- 
ing to the minority group declines sufficiently 
quickly at t, then y falls at t. In this case, the 
admissions  office might not be able to admit its 
favorite candidates without violating the con- 
straint  that the probability  of admission be in- 
creasing in t. 
In Figure 1, y attains  its maximum  at ta: the 
admissions office prefers candidates  scoring ta 
to all others. Since r must increase in t,  the 
admissions  office cannot  admit  candidates  scor- 
ing ta without  also admitting  all candidates  with 
higher test scores. If C is too small to admit all 
such candidates, the only way to admit some 
candidates  scoring ta is to adopt a random  rule. 
To determine  which random  rule is optimal,  let, 
for  t1  <  t2, 
(8) 
ft2  y(t)(n(t)  + w(t)) dt 
tj 
F(tl,  t2)-=  t2 n(t) + w(t) dt 
y  t 
i y(tl) 
for t  <  t2 
for ti =  t2. 
F(tl,  t2)  is the average  value of 7y  over (t  ,  t2). 
In Figure 1, let tm be the global maximum of 
F(.,  1). This means that the admissions office 
prefers a  randomly drawn candidate scoring 
above tm  to a randomly  drawn  candidate  scoring 
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Figure 7: Admission oce's preferences over test scores under color-blind admission policy
(Figure 1 in Chan and Eyster 2003)
The curves  () and  (; t) as a function of t are illustrated in Figure 7. In Figure 7, 
attains its maximum at ta; but since r must be increasing in t; the admission oce cannot
admit applicants with test score ta without also admitting students with higher test scores,
even though as shown in the gure, those with higher test scores have lower values of :
The optimal color blind admission rule turns out to involve randomization and the optimal
random rule depends on  (; t): In Figure 7,  (; t) attains the global maximum at tm: Thus,
the admission oce prefers a randomly drawn applicant scoring above tm to a randomly
drawn applicant scoring above other t: If the capacity C is suciently small, the admission
oce will randomly admit applicants with test scores in the interval [tm; t] with a constant
probability chosen to just ll the capacity. if the capacity is suciently large, the admission
oce will admit all applicants with test scores above tm with probability 1 and then admit
applicants scoring below tm in descending order of the test score. To summarize, if  ()
as dened in (58) is not everywhere increasing in t; the optimal color blind admission rule
must involve randomization for some values of capacity C:
Under random admission rules, applicants with higher test scores are not admitted with
probability 1 at the same time that those with lower test scores are admitted with positive
probability, the allocation of the seats are thus not ecient in terms of student quality.
For any random color blind admission rule r; one can construct a color sighted threshold
admission rule (tB;tW) that achieves the same diversity as that under r; but yields higher
53quality.
A general equilibrium framework. A similar analysis of the eect of banning Ar-
mative Action in college admissions, but with colleges competing for students, can be found
in Epple, Romano and Sieg (2008).23 In their model, colleges care about the academic
qualications of their students and about income as well as racial diversity. Ability and
income are correlated with race. Vertically dierentiated colleges compete for desirable
students using nancial aid and admission policies. They show that because of armative
action minority students pay lower tuition and attend higher-quality schools. The paper
characterizes the eects of a ban on armative action. A version of the model calibrated to
U.S. data shows that a ban of armative action leads to a substantial decline of minority
students in the top-tier colleges. In an empirical analysis, Arcidiacono (2005) also nds
that removing advantages for minorities in admission policies substantially decreases the
number of minority students at top tier schools.
6.6.3 Color sighted vs. color blind armative action with endogenous skills
The analysis of armative action in Coate and Loury (1993a) assumed that quotas are
to be imposed in the hiring stage. In practice, policymakers who are interested in improving
the welfare of the disadvantaged group could potentially intervene in several dierent stages.
For example, in the context of Coate and Loury's model, policymakers could potentially
intervene by subsidizing the skill investment of workers from the disadvantaged group.
Fryer and Loury (2008) extends the Chan and Eyster (2003) model to add an ex ante skill
investment stage to shed some light on the following question: where in the economic life
cycle should preferential treatment be most emphasized, before or after productivities have
been determined?
Recall that in Chan and Eyster (2003)'s model, the test score distribution for group j
applicants are assumed to dier by group exogenously. Fryer and Loury (2008) endogenize
the dierences in fj (t) by assuming that groups dier in the distribution of investment
costs, and that the test score distributions fj (t) are related to the investment decisions.
Specically, let Gj (c) be the cumulative distribution of skill investment cost in group j;
and let G(c) 
P
j=fB;Wg jGj (c) be the eort cost distribution in the entire population,
with gj () and g () as their respective densities.
Denote an agent's skill investment decision as e 2 f0;1g: Suppose that the distribution
of productivity v; analogous to the test score t in Chan and Eyster (2003), for an agent
23See also Epple, Romano and Sieg (2002).
54depends on e; with He (v) and he (v) as the CDF and PDF of v if the investment decision is
e: If the fraction of individuals in group j who invested in skills is j; then the distribution
of test scores in group j, again denoted by Fj (v), with f being the corresponding density,
will be
Fj (v)  F (v;j) = jH1 (v) + (1   j)H0 (v):
Let F 1 (z;) for z 2 [0;1] denote the productivity level at the z-th quantile of the distri-
bution F (v;): Suppose that there is a total measure C < 1 of available \slots" that will
allow an individual with productivity v to produce v units of output.
Laissez-faire Equilibrium. Fryer and Loury (2008) rst analyzed the equilibrium allo-
cation of the productive \slots" and the investment decisions under laissez-faire. Let m be
the fraction of the population choosing e = 1 in equilibrium and let pm be the equilibrium
price for a \slot." Clearly,
pm = F 1 (1   C;m): (60)
Given pm; the ex ante expected gross return from skill investment is
Z 1
pm




where H (v) = H1 (v)   H0 (v)  0: Since agents will invest in skills if and only if the








The laissez-faire equilibrium (m;pm) is thus characterized by Eq. (60) and (62). Note
that after substituting the expression of pm in (60) into (62), and taking G 1 on both sides,





It can be formally shown that the laissez-faire equilibrium (m;pm) characterized above
is socially ecient. To see this, write an allocation as hej (c);j (v)i where ej (c) 2
f0;1g;j (v) 2 [0;1] are respectively the eort and slot assignment probability for each
type of agent at the two stages. Let j 
R 1
0 ej (c)dGj (c) be the fraction of group j popu-
lation that invest in skills under eort rule ej (c): An allocation hej (c);j (v)i;j 2 fB;Wg;




j (v)dF (v;j)  C: (64)











subject to the feasibility constraint (64).
We can rewrite the above eciency problem as follows. Suppose that the fraction of




0 ej (c)dGj (c).
Eciency would require that the slots are only allocated to those in the top C quantile of
the productivity distribution, thus the aggregate production for any given  in an ecient





To achieve a fraction  of population investing, the ecient investment rule ej (c);j 2
fB;Wg; must be that only those in the lowest -quantile in the eort cost distribution
















The characterization for the socially ecient level of  is identical to that of the laissez-
faire equilibrium of m provided in (63), thus  = m: Since it is also obvious that the
slot assignment rule under the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation is exactly the same as
the ecient assignment rule for a given ; we conclude that the laissez-faire equilibrium is
ecient.
Let 
j be the faction of group j agents who acquires slots under the laissez-faire equilib-
rium. Under the plausible assumption that gB (c)=gW (c) is strictly increasing in c; which,
among other things, implies that GB (c) rst order stochastically dominates GW (c); then
the laissez-faire equilibrium will have a smaller fraction of the group B agents assigned with
slots.
Let us suppose that a regulator aims to raise the fraction of group B agents with slots
to a target level B 2 (
B;C]: Moreover, suppose that the regulator's armative action
policy tools are limited to (W;B;W;B) where j is the regulator's transfers to group
56j agents who invest in skills and j is a transfer to group j agents who hold slots. Fryer
and Loury (2008) interpret j as intervention at the ex ante investment margin, and j as
intervention at the ex post assignment margin. It is easy to see that we can without loss of
generality set either W or B to zero, because a universal transfer to all slot holders will
just be capitalized into the slot price. Let us set W = 0:
Color Sighted Intervention. First consider the case of color-sighted armative action,
which simply means that (j;j) can dier by group identity j: Fix a policy (W;B;B);
let j be the fraction of group j agents who invest in skills, and let p be the equilibrium
slot price. We know that only group B agents with v above p B will obtain a slot. Thus
to achieve the policy goal B; we must have
1   F (p   B;B) = B;
that is,
p   B = F 1 (1   B;B): (69)
From the slot clearing condition, WW + BB = C; we can solve for W for any policy
goal B; i.e., W = (C   BB)=W: The equilibrium slot price p must satisfy:
1   F (p;W) = W;
or equivalently;
p = F 1 (1   W;W): (70)
A group j agent will invest in skills if his investment cost c, minus the transfer j, is less

















For a given pair (W;B); Equations (69)-(72) uniquely determine the policy parameters
(W;B;B) and the equilibrium slot price p for whites that will implement the armative
action target B 2 (
B;C]: What remains to be determined is the constrained ecient levels
of (s
W;s



















Problem (73) is separable by group. Thus, the rst order condition for the constrained
ecient levels of (s
W;s
B) is analogous to (68), except that now it is group specic, namely,












Combining the characterization of (s
W;s
B ) provided in (74) with the (69)-(72), we
immediately have the following result: given an armative action target B 2 (
B;C]; the
ecient color sighted armative action policy is
W = B = 0;B = F 1 (1   W;s
W)   F 1 (1   B;s
B );
where W = (C   BB)=W; and (s
W;s
B ) satisfy (74).
In other words, when the armative action policies can be conditioned on group identity,
the regulator will not use explicit skill subsidies to promote the access of a disadvantaged
group to scarce positions. Of course, by favoring disadvantaged group at the slot assignment
stage, skill investment is still implicitly subsidized for the disadvantaged. To spell out the
intuition for the result, it is useful to note that, due to the noise in the productivity following
skill investment, because productivity v conditional on investment is distributed as H1 (v);
subsidy on the ex ante skill investment will lead to leakage in the sense that some black
agents may decide to invest in skills as a result of skill subsidy, but may end up with low
productivity and be assigned a slot. An ex post subsidy on the slot price for the blacks is
a more targeted policy.
Color Blind Intervention. Now consider the case where policies cannot condition on
color, that is, W = B = c and W = B = : As we discussed earlier, if  > 0; but the
price of slots are allowed to be set in equilibrium, the slot price subsidy  will be reected
in a higher slot price. Thus in fact, the regulator may as well set  = 0, but instead
impose a cap pc for the slot price. The idea of implementing armative action using color
blind policy instruments is similar to that detailed in Chan and Eyster (2003): imposing
a lower threshold (i.e., a cap on the slot price) and employing randomization. If there are
24(73) is derived analogous to (66) and (67). Note that the transfers and subsidies (W;B;B) do not
factor into the calculation for social surplus.
58more blacks at the assignment margin pm identied for the laissez-faire equilibrium, the
armative action goal B may be achieved because lowering the margin and randomizing
the slot assignment for those above the margin favors the blacks.
Let (c;pc) be the color blind policy. Suppose that the fraction of individuals who invest
in skills under such a policy is c in the population and c
j within group j: Given the price
cap pc; the total measure of individuals whose productivity v (and thus willingness to pay
for a slot) is above pc is given by 1   F (pc;c): Thus the random rationing probability,
denoted by c; is given by
c =
C
1   F (pc;c)
< 1: (75)
The gross returns from investing in skills when slots are rationed is given by +c R 1
pc H (v)dv:





















for j = B;W: (77)
In equilibrium, the proportion of blacks assigned with a slot is given by c [1   F (pc;c
B)]:
To satisfy the armative action target B, it must be the case that
B = c [1   F (pc;c
B)]: (78)
Substituting the expression of c from (75) into (78), the armative action target constraint
can be rewritten as:
B =
C [1   F (pc;c
B)]










1   F (pc;c)
; (79)
where the second equality follows from substituting (77) for c
B: It can be shown that, for
a xed c (and thus xed c
B as well due to (77)), the right hand side is strictly decreasing
in pc: Thus for any target B, there exists a unique pc to achieve the target and the price
cap pc is lower, the more aggressive the target B is.
Because (76) tells us that the skill subsidy c is uniquely determined by (c;pc); we can
recast the regulator's problem as choosing (c;pc) to maximize the social surplus given by
C







subject to the armative action target constraint (79). Let (c;pc) be the solution to
the above problem. From the rst order condition to problem (80), Fryer and Loury (2008)
59showed that c corresponding to (c;pc); which can be derived from (76) as
c = G 1 (c)  
C



















Note that the left hand side term, if multiplied by B; is the relative fraction of blacks among
agents on the ex post assignment margin pc; and the right hand side term, if multiplied by
B; is the relative fraction of blacks on the ex ante skill investment margin with c = G 1 ():
Thus we have the following result: given an armative action target B 2 (
B;C]; and let
(c;pc) solve problem (80), then the ecient color blind armative action policy will
involve strictly positive skill investment subsidy c > 0 if (81) holds at (c;pc):
6.7 Additional issues related to armative action
Besides the theoretical examinations of the eects of armative action on incentives and
welfare a recent literature asks whether armative action policies in college and professional
school admissions may have led to mismatch that could inadvertently hurt, rather than,
help, the intended beneciaries. This so-called \mismatch" literature examines how some
measured outcomes, such as GPA, wages, or bar passage rate, etc., for minorities are aected
by armative action admission policies.25 A recent paper by Arcidiacono, Aucejo, Fang
and Spenner (2009) takes a new viewpoint by asking why minority students would be
willing to enroll themselves at schools where they cannot succeed, as stipulated by the
mismatch hypothesis. They show that a necessary condition for mismatch to occur once we
take into account the minority students' rational enrollment decisions is that the selective
university has private information about the treatment eect of the students, and provide
tests for the necessary condition. They implement the test using data from the Campus
Life and Learning Project (CLL) at Duke University. Evidence shows that Duke does
possess private information that is a statistically signicant predictor of the students' post-
enrollment academic performance. Further, this private information is shown to aect
subjective measures of students' satisfaction as well as their persistence in more dicult
majors. They also propose strategies to evaluate more conclusively whether the presence of
Duke private information has generated mismatch.
25See Loury and Garman (1995), Sanders 2004, Ayres and Brooks 2005, Ho (2005), Chambers et. al.
(2005), Barnes (2007 )and Rothstein and Yoon (2008).
60In the class of models where discriminatory outcomes arise as a result of multiple equi-
libria and coordination failure, as reviewed in section 3 and 4, armative action can be
interpreted as an attempt to eliminate the Pareto dominated equilibrium where the dis-
advantaged group coordinates on. One of the problem, as illustrated by the patronizing
equilibrium identied by Coate and Loury (1993a) and described in Section 6.2.2, is that
armative action policies may lead to new equilibrium with inequality. In an interesting pa-
per, Chung (1999) interprets the armative action problem as an implementation problem
and ask whether more elaborate armative action policies can be identied that will elimi-
nate the Pareto dominated equilibrium without generating any new undesirable equilibria.
Chung (1999) shows that in a Coate and Loury model, a class of policies that combine
unemployment insurance and employment subsidy (insurance-cum-subsidy) can eliminate
the bad equilibrium without generating any new undesirable equilibria. The insurance-cum-
subsidy policy can be interpreted as follows: each worker from a certain group is oered
an option to buy an unemployment insurance package at the time he makes his human
capital investment. The insurance is unattractive to any worker unless the probability of
being unemployed is suciently high; enough workers buying this insurance will trigger a
group-wide employment subsidy. A policy like this does not lead to undesirable patronizing
equilibrium because the employment subsidies appear only if workers believe the employers
are too reluctant to hire them.
Abdulkadiroglu (2005) studies the eect of armative action in college admission from
the perspective of matching theory. He interprets the college admissions problem as a many-
to-one two-sided matching problem with a nite set of students and a nite set of colleges.
Each college has a nite capacity to enroll students. The preference relation of each student
over colleges is a linear order of colleges, where as the preference relation of each college
over sets of students is a linear order of the set of students. He examines the conditions for
the existence of stable mechanisms that make truthful revelation of student preferences a
dominant strategy with and without armative action quotas.
Fu (2006) studies the eect of armative action using insights from all-pay auctions.
He considers a situation where two students, one majority and one minority, are competing
for one college seat. The college wants to maximize test scores, which depends only on
the students' eorts. Suppose that the benet from attending the college is higher for
the majority student than for the minority student. The two students compete for the
college seat by choosing eort levels. Fu (2006) shows that this problem is analogous to a
asymmetric complete information all-pay auction problem where the college can be thought
of as the \seller," and the two students the \bidders," the test scores (or the eorts) are
61the \bids," and the students' benet from attending the college \values of the object to the
bidders." He then uses insights from asymmetric all-pay auctions to show that to maximize
the test scores, the college actually should adopt an admission rule that favors the minority
students to exactly oset his disadvantage in value from attending the college relative to
the majority student. In a similar vein, Fryer and Loury (2005) use a tournament model
to investigate the categorical redistributions in a winner-take-all market and show that
optimally designed tournaments naturally involve \handicapping."26
7 Eciency implications of statistical discrimination
In models of statistical discrimination the use of group identity as a proxy for relevant
variables is typically the informationally ecient response of an information-seeking, indi-
vidually rational agents. Eciency considerations are therefore especially appropriate in
these settings, and a small literature has been devoted to analyzing the dierent sources of
ineciency arising from statistical discrimination. This is in sharp contrast to Becker-style
taste discrimination models where eciency is not an issue. In models where discrimination
arises directly from preferences, any limitation in the use of group identity generates some
ineciencies, at least directly.
7.1 Eciency in models with exogenous dierences
In Phelps' (1972) basic model analyzed in Section 2, discrimination has a purely redis-
tributive nature. If employers were not allowed to use race as a source of information, wages
would then equal the expected productivity of the entire population conditional on signal










[B + (1   )W]
where  is the share of group-B workers in the labor market, 2 = 22





"B + (1   )
2 2
"W: Assuming a total population size of 1, total product would be
equal to average productivity,  = B + (1   )W: This quantity is the same as when
the employers are allowed to discriminate by race. Thus, there is no eciency gain from
26Schotter and Weigelt (1992) found evidence that armative action may increase the total output in an
asymmetric tournament in a laboratory setting. Caterina, Franke and Rey-Biel (2009) have similar ndings
in a real-world eld experiment involving school children. See Holzer and Neumark (2000) for a detailed
survey of available evidence regarding the incentive eects of armative action policies.
62discrimination. This equivalence, however, is an artifact of the extreme simplicity of the
model and is not robust to many simple extensions.
Suppose, as an illustration, that there are two jobs in the economy, with dierent tech-
nologies. Assume that workers with productivity less than the population average  are
only productive in job 1, and workers with productivity greater than  are only productive
in job 2. In this case, E(qj) = , therefore it is optimal for rms to allocate workers with
signals  <  to job 1 and workers with signals    to job 2. Some mismatches will occur.
If populations have dierent population averages, B 6= W, then the optimal allocation
rule follows thresholds j, j 2 fB;Wg computed to satisfy E(qjj) = , which dier by
group. Mismatch increases when employers are not allowed to discriminate by race, because
race functions eectively as a proxy for productivity.
When human capital investment is endogenous, as in Lundberg and Startz's (1983)
version of Phelps' model, eciency also depends on the human capital investment cost paid
by workers. One source of ineciency of discriminatory outcomes is that the marginal
worker from the dominant group pays a higher cost than the marginal worker from the
discriminated group. Using the parameterization presented in Section 2.2.2, the marginal
worker produces






(see equation 2) after spending C(X) = cX2=2 in investment costs. Hence the net social
product of human capital investment in group-j is


























To generate a discriminatory equilibrium, assume 2
"B > 2
"W. In this case it is ecient
to transfer some units of training from high cost W workers to low-cost B workers. In
general, a ban on the use of race results in a more ecient solution relative to the statistical
discrimination outcome.
As Lundberg and Startz (1983) note in their conclusion, however, this result is not
robust, and it is meant to illustrate a more general principle that in a second-best world,
as one in which there is incomplete information, \there is no reason to assume that ap-
proaching the rst best - using more information - is welfare improving. Since the problem
of incomplete information is endemic in situations of discrimination, considerations of the
second best are a general concomitant to policy questions in this area."
63Other papers focus therefore on sources for the opposite outcome, that is on showing
that statistical discrimination may be eciency enhancing. This depends on the details of
the model specication and sometimes on the parameterization of the model.
Schwab (1986), for example, focused on one specic type of mismatching that statistical
discrimination generates. In this paper, workers can pool with other workers in a \stan-
dardized" labor market in which individual productivity cannot be detected, and therefore
everybody is paid a wage equal to the average productivity in the pool of workers. Workers
can, alternatively, self-employ and receive compensation that is an increasing function of
their ability. The marginal worker is indierent between self-employment and the stan-
dardized market. However, her productivity in the standardized market must be higher
than her wage, because all of the workers in her pool have lower productivity. This is an
informational externality which implies an employment level in the standardized market
lower than socially optimal.
Consider adding to this model a second group of workers with higher average ability
in the standardized market. In an equilibrium with statistical discrimination, wage in the
standardized market will depend on group identity, and will be higher for members of the
second group. A ban on statistical discrimination practices will equalize such wage, but
will have ambiguous eects on eciency. It will increase standardized market employment
for members of the less productive group, therefore approaching the rst-best solution for
this group, but the opposite happens for members of the more productive group. The total
eect depends on the details of the ability distribution in the two groups.27
7.2 Eciency in models with endogenous dierences
The same eects play a role in the equilibrium models of statistical discrimination
analyzed in sections 3 and 4: the ecient allocation of workers to jobs, the role of the
informational externalities due to imperfect information. In addition, eciency may depend
on the eects on the cost of human capital investment, and, depending on the technology,
the role of complementarities in the production function.
Two broad sets of questions can be asked in this context. First, does the planners'
problem solution imply dierential treatment across groups? Secondly, are discriminatory
equilibria more ecient than symmetric, non-discriminatory equilibria?
27A similar model is also analyzed in Haagsma (1993), who considers also the eects of varying labor
supply.
647.2.1 The planners' problem
A comprehensive analysis of the various eects is performed in Norman (2004), where
symmetric outcomes are compared to discrimination in the planners' problem.
Norman adopts a simplied version of the model in Moro and Norman (2004) and shows
rst that if the planner is allowed to discriminate between groups, then the production
possibility frontier expands. This is a direct implication of employers' imperfect information.
Assume for simplicity there are only two signals, H(igh) and L(ow), such that the probability
that a qualied worker receives a high signal is f > 1=2, whereas the same probability for
a low-signal worker is (1   f). For an intuition, consider the case where groups have equal
size, and compare the situations where both groups invest the same amount  with the case
where they invest dierently, B < W; but aggregate investment is equal to :
It is not dicult to see that the production possibility frontier expands with group
inequality. Any factor input combination (C;S) with S > 0, C > 0 achievable in the
symmetric case can be improved upon by replacing a high-signal B worker employed in the
complex task with a high-signal W worker employed in the simple task. Substituting these
two workers does not change the input in the simple task, but it increases expected input
in the complex task because the expected productivity in the complex task is higher for W
workers,
Wf
Wf + (1   W)(1   f)
>
Bf
Bf + (1   B)(1   f)
: (82)
Incomplete information generates misallocation of workers to task. In an asymmetric equi-
librium race functions as an additional signal that moderates the informational problem.
To generate higher investment in group W however, the planner has to pay high signal
workers from this group a higher premium. Such premium can be \nanced" via a transfer
or resources from group B, or exploiting the informational eciency gains. Norman shows
with two parametric examples the role of the dierence between a linear technology and
a technology with complementarities. The crucial result is that when there are comple-
mentarities, the discriminatory solution may result in Pareto-gains, that is, in an outcome
where both groups are better-o. On the other hand, when technology is linear, the plan-
ner can implement the ecient asymmetric solution only by transferring resources from the
discriminated group to the dominant group.
It is possible to illustrate this result with a simple parametric example. Consider a
technology given by y(C;S) =
p
CS with cost of investment equal to 0 for half of the
workers of either group, and 0.1 for everybody else. As in the example described above,
there are only two feasible signals, H and L, and with f = 2=3:
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The advantage of the cost distribution we adopted is that the solution is either  = 1=2
or  = 1 so we only need to compare these two cases. When  = 1 everybody is equally
productive in either task, therefore the optimal solution is to assign half the population to
each task, and total output is y = 0:5: When  = 1=2; one can easily compute that the
optimal solution is to assign all H workers to the complex task and all L workers to the
simple task. In this case C = 2=3  1=2 and S = 1=2, which implies y = 0:5
p
2=3 < 0:5:
Cost of investment is zero when  = 1=2 and 0:05 when  = 1. Hence the optimal solution
is  = 1. In this solution, there are 2/3 workers with signal H, hence to implement this
outcome, the planner can pay L workers 0 and H workers 3/2. Incentives to invest are
3/2*(2/3-1/3)=1/2.
To solve for the asymmetric outcome, note that in the symmetric solution 1/2 of the
workers are employed in the simple task but do not need to be qualied. Hence, it would
be more ecient if we could \tag" half the workers and induce them not to invest in human
capital. Using race, the planner can have all W workers replicate what they do in the
previous outcome, and all B workers not to invest in human capital. Then, assign all W
workers to the complex task and all B workers to the simple task. Output would be the
same, but half of the investment costs would be the saved. This outcome is implementable
by paying all B workers 1/2 regardless of their signal, and paying W workers as before.
Total wage bill is 1/2 for B workers, and 3/2*2/3*1/2=1/2 for W workers. Because of the
savings in investment cost, the B group is more than fully compensated in this outcome.
What this example shows is that complementarities in the production function coupled
with specialization allow the planner to reduce investment cost without changing output.
This would be impossible in the linear case because less investment implies lower out-
put. Therefore, the gains from specialization cannot be redistributed across groups without
breaking incentive compatibility. In a parametric example, Norman shows that even in
the linear case there may be eciency gains from discrimination in the planners' problem
(arising from reduced mismatching), but that the added investment for the dominant group
must be supported using transfers from the discriminated group.
7.2.2 The eciency of discriminatory equilibria
Considering the case of the equilibrium model in Moro and Norman (2004) with a linear
technology, where discrimination results from coordination failure (see Section 3), note that
equilibria are Pareto-ranked. To see this, the model with a single group of workers displaying
two equilibrium levels of human capital investment, 1 > 2. Under 1; wages as a function
66of  are weakly greater than under the lower level of human capital investment 2: Therefore,
all workers that either do not invest or that do invest in both equilibria are better o under
the high human capital investment equilibrium because they have higher expected wages,
which can be computed using (3) by integrating over the relevant distribution of ; that is
fq for workers that invest, and fu for workers that do not invest. There is a set of workers
that do not invest under 2 but do invest and pay the investment cost under 1: To see
that even these workers are better-o, note that because they choose to invest, it must
be that the benets outweigh the cost, that is,
R
w(;1)fq()   c 
R
w(;1)fu(): The






w(;2)fu(); that is, even these workers
strictly prefer the higher investment equilibrium.
Hence, because of the linearity in production, separability between groups implies that
discriminatory equilibrium is not ecient. When production displays complementarities,
because of eects that are similar to the one displayed in the example illustrated in the
planners' problem, we conjecture the possibility that group-wide Pareto gains may exist in
discriminatory equilibria relative to symmetric equilibria.
8 Conclusion
This chapter surveyed the theoretical literature on statistical discrimination and arma-
tive action stressing the dierent explanation for group inequality that have been developed
from the seminal articles of Phelps (1972) and Arrow(1973), and their policy implications.
In this conclusion, we highlight some areas for potentially fruitful future research. First,
as we mentioned in Section 5, we still have a relatively poor theoretical understanding on
the evolution of stereotypes, under what conditions do they arise and lead to permanent
inequality, and how the stereotypes are aected by supposedly temporary armative action
policies. There is not yet any study on how armative action policies might change the
dynamics of the between-group inequalities. Can temporary armative action measures
indeed lead to between-group equalities, as proclaimed in Supreme Court justices opinion
in 1978 and 1993? Second, most of the existing literature on armative action has studied
a quite stylized version of the policy, assuming that employers follow quotas set by the
policymaker. In practice, however, the policy maker rarely sets clearly dened quotas. In
addition, there exist agency issues between the policymaker (the principal) and the decision-
makers (the agent). As an example that should be familiar in the academic world, consider
the case of a college dean and a research department that place dierent weights on their
67concern for academic excellence and faculty racial or gender diversity. How armative ac-
tion policies should be optimally designed in light of such agency issues is also an important
question to study.
Finally, this survey has not made much connection between the theoretical models and
the small existing empirical literature related to statistical discrimination theories. Most
of the empirical literature on racial and gender inequality focuses on measuring inequality
after controlling for a number of measurable factors without attempting to attribute the
unexplained residuals to a specic source of discrimination.28 Some articles attempt to test
implications of statistical discrimination directly, with mixed evidence. For example, Altonji
and Pierret (2001) test dynamic wage implications of statistical discrimination.29 Another
growing literature attempts to use statistical evidence to distinguish statistical discrimi-
nation from racial prejudice, particularly regarding racial proling in highway stops and
searches.30 In surveying the trends of Black-White wage inequality, Neal (2008) nds that
returns to schooling and other test scores are higher for minorities, evidence that he claims
to be counterfactual to statistical discrimination theories based on endogenous dierential
incentives to acquire skills.31 However, the human-capital based theories that originate from
Arrow (1973)'s insight depend crucially on unobserved human capital investment, therefore
they do not directly imply that returns to observable human capital, such as education,
should be dierent or higher for the dominant group. For example, conditional on educa-
tion, statistical discrimination can predict that members of the discriminated group exert
lower learning eort because they have less incentives to do so; but returns to schooling
might be higher for them. In addition, the theory only predicts that groups have dier-
ent returns to the skill signals that are observed by employers, not to signals observed by
the investigator. Even if we interpret education (or any other observable test score) as a
signal of skill, a regression of wages on such signals produces estimates that suer from
omitted variable bias whenever rms also use privately observed signals. The size of this
bias depends on group fundamentals in ways that might confuse the inference made by the
28Most of these articles assume or suggest that the unexplained dierences should be attributed to racial
bias. Interested readers should consult the surveys by Altonji and Blank (1999) and Holzer and Neumark
(2000).
29See also Lange (2007).
30See, e.g., Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) and Anwar and Fang (2006) for evidence on police racial
proling. Fang and Persico (2010) provides a unied framework to distinguish racial prejudice from statistical
discrimination that is applicable in many settings.
31For additional evidence on returns to aptitude test scores, see Neal and Johnson (1993) and, with more
recent data, Fadlon (2010). See also Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) for evidence on returns to education
controlling for selection bias.
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Nevertheless, we believe that studying ways to reconcile empirical facts about wage dif-
ferences and the typical theoretical predictions of statistical discrimination theories could
be a fruitful area of future research. Some attempts at structurally estimating statistical
discrimination models nd that even stylized versions of these models t the data quite
well. For example, Moro (2003) structurally estimates a model based on Moro and Norman
(2004) using Current Population Survey data and nds that adverse equilibrium selection
did not play a role in exacerbating wage inequality during the last part of the 20th cen-
tury. Fang (2006) estimates, using Census data, an equilibrium labor market model with
endogenous education choices based on Fang (2001) to assess the relative importance of hu-
man capital enhancement versus ability signaling in explaining the college wage premium.
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) estimate a structural equilibrium search model to distinguish
the roles of skill dierences among groups and employers' racial prejudice to explain racial
wage inequality.33 However, these estimates are not designed to perform model validation.
Research addressing the identication issue of how to disentangle dierent sources of group
inequality (being from statistical, taste-based discrimination, or from dierences in groups'
fundamentals) would be especially welcome.
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